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 I 
 
Abstract 
 
This project contains a comprehensive financial analysis of Corticeira Amorim S.G.P.S., S.A. (COR). It was 
conducted in accordance with ISEG’s Master in Finance final work project standards and written 
following the CFA Institute Research Challenge guidelines. COR is a Portuguese cork manufacturer, 
primarily focused on the production of cork stoppers. This family-owned company has been the 
indisputable market leader for almost 150 years, accounting for 44% of the worldwide market for cork 
stoppers in 2018. A Free Cash Flow to the Firm approach was used to reach a BUY recommendation with 
a 2019YE price target of €10.9/sh, implying a +21% upside potential from the December 31st,2018 
closing price of €9.0/sh. The original research is extended in the current work to address the possible 
hesitancy of potential investors regarding the Amorim family majority ownership of ~75%. Our analysis 
shows that COR is contradicting a stream of existent literature on corporate governance, proving that 
family-owned companies can protect minority interests when they aim to fuel the family’s wealth.  
The information used throughout this report was publicly available as of December 31st, 2018. Thus any 
information or subsequent events have not been considered.  
 
 
 
JEL classifications: G10, G32, G34, G35, G38 
Keywords: Equity Research; Valuation; Discounted Cash Flow; Family Firms;  Payout Policy  
 II 
 
Resumo 
 
Este projeto contém uma análise financeira exaustiva da Corticeira Amorim S.G.P.S., S.A. (COR). Foi 
desenvolvido de acordo com as diretivas do trabalho final do Mestrado em Finanças do ISEG e elaborado 
de acordo com a estrutura recomendada pelo CFA Institute Research Challenge. A COR é uma produtora 
portuguesa de cortiça, com um foco na produção de rolhas. Esta empresa familiar é líder incontestável de 
mercado há quase 150 anos, com uma quota de mercado no sector das rolhas de 44% em 2018. 
Utilizou-se o modelo DCF para obter uma recomendação de COMPRA com um preço alvo de €10.9/ação 
para o final de 2019, o que implica um potencial de crescimento de 21% em relação ao preço de fecho de 
€9.0/ação a 31 de dezembro de 2018.  A avaliação inicial é complementada com uma análise detalhada 
aos problemas de corporate governance consequentes da participação maioritária da família Amorim, e 
em como a política de dividendos é afetada. A nossa análise demonstra que a COR contraria a literatura 
disponível sobre corporate governance, atestando que as empresas familiares são de facto capazes de 
proteger os interesses de investidores minoritários quando o objetivo é expandir a riqueza da família.  
A informação utilizada ao longo deste relatório era publicamente conhecida a 31 de Dezembro de 2018, 
pelo que qualquer informação ou eventos subsequentes não foram considerados.  
 
 
 
JEL classifications: G10, G32, G34, G35, G38 
Keywords: Equity Research; Avaliação; Discounted Cash Flow; Empresas Familiares; Política de 
Dividendos 
 
 
  
 III 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
In memory of my father. Even though I never had the chance to meet you, you will always be my number 
one inspiration. And I hope that one day I can be half the person that you were.  
To my mother. Thank you for always being a role model, for teaching me to never give up on my dreams 
and to always strive for something better. I love you, and I’ll forever be grateful for everything you have 
done for me.  
To Pestana. I have no words to describe your unconditional love and support. Every day you encourage 
me to follow my dreams and to pursue what makes me happy. I would not be able to go through these 
almost two years without you. A thank you will never be enough. I love you.  
To Filipa, Chhotobhai, Joana and Zarko. This journey would not have been the same without you. Thank 
you for the hard work, the long working hours, the funny moments, the discussions and for all the 
chocolate (obviously). Thank you for teaching me what a real group looks like. I’m beyond proud of all 
our conquers and for how we were able to surpass our weaknesses together. This experience will forever 
be part of me – and so will you.  
To Victor. Thank you for all the guidance and support you gave us throughout these months. It was a 
pleasure to work with you and to learn so much from you. I’m sure that your teachings will forever mark 
our professional careers, and we will be better professionals because of you.  
To Professor Clara. Thank you for putting the group together and for giving us the conditions to thrive. 
You’re a true example of leadership.  
To Rita and Santiago. A very special thank you for putting up with me during these months. I’m aware 
that I was not easy to deal with but your support kept me going through it all. I’m so glad that I got the 
chance to meet you. You will always have a very special place in my heart. 
To my friends and family. Thank you for everything.  
 
 
 
  
 IV 
 
Disclosure 
 
A significant portion of this report was submitted by a group of students from ISEG, including the 
candidate, for the 2019 CFA Institute Research Challenge Portuguese Local Final. Upon winning the local 
final, the same report advanced as the representative report for CFA Society Portugal in the 2019 EMEA 
Regional Final in Zurich, Switzerland. 
This report is published for educational purposes by Master students at ISEG and is not an investment 
recommendation. This report must be read with the Disclosures and Disclaimer at the end of this report. 
Appendices that support this report may be obtained from the author upon request.   
 V 
 
Index 
 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................................................................... I 
Resumo .............................................................................................................................................................................................. II 
Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................................................................ III 
Disclosure ........................................................................................................................................................................................ IV 
Index ................................................................................................................................................................................................... V 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................................................................. VI 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................................................................ VII 
Research Snapshot ......................................................................................................................................................................... 1 
Business Description ..................................................................................................................................................................... 2 
Corporate Governance .................................................................................................................................................................. 3 
Industry Overview and Competitive Positioning ............................................................................................................... 4 
Investment Summary .................................................................................................................................................................... 7 
Valuation ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 8 
Financial Analysis ........................................................................................................................................................................... 9 
Investment Risks ......................................................................................................................................................................... 10 
Dividend Policy under a Family-Owned Company ......................................................................................................... 11 
Appendices ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 13 
References ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 32 
Disclosures and Disclaimer ..................................................................................................................................................... 34 
 
 
  
 VI 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1:  COR’s Price Target...................................................................................................................................................... 1 
Figure 2: Market share in the cork stoppers industry 2017YE .................................................................................... 1 
Figure 3: Consolidated sales by BU 2018F (inside) vs 2023F (outside) ................................................................... 2 
Figure 4: Consolidated sales by region 2017YE ................................................................................................................. 2 
Figure 5: EBITDA contribution by BU .................................................................................................................................... 2 
Figure 6: Sales vs EBITDA (in millions) ................................................................................................................................. 2 
Figure 7: Average selling price of the highest quality cork amadia (€/@) .............................................................. 3 
Figure 8: No. of cork stoppers sold by top 3 companies (in billions) 2017YE ........................................................ 3 
Figure 9: Avg. annual TCA detection (%) .............................................................................................................................. 3 
Figure 10: Shareholder’s Structure ......................................................................................................................................... 3 
Figure 11: Location of the cork oak forestry ........................................................................................................................ 4 
Figure 12:  Uses of cork bark ...................................................................................................................................................... 4 
Figure 13:  Wine closures market ............................................................................................................................................ 4 
Figure 14:  GDP vs Household Disposable Income (HDI) vs Wine Consumption in the US ............................... 5 
Figure 15:  Wine consumption in 2017 (in mhl) ................................................................................................................ 5 
Figure 16:  Top 4 wine producing countries in 2017 (in mhl)...................................................................................... 5 
Figure 17:  Wine consumption vs wine production (in mhl) ........................................................................................ 5 
Figure 18:  Risk of fires in Portugal vs Location of Montados ....................................................................................... 6 
Figure 19:  Average extraction costs per year (€/@)....................................................................................................... 6 
Figure 20:  Porter’s Five Forces ................................................................................................................................................ 6 
Figure 21:  Bottled wine price breakdown by type of wine, in the UK ...................................................................... 6 
Figure 22:  Evolution of COGS and price of cork bark ...................................................................................................... 7 
Figure 23:  COR’s avg. selling price per stopper vs avg. cost per stopper ................................................................ 7 
Figure 24:  Net Debt vs EBITDA ................................................................................................................................................ 7 
Figure 25:  Total CAPEX vs Sales .............................................................................................................................................. 7 
Figure 26:  Dividend vs FCF (in millions) .............................................................................................................................. 9 
Figure 27:  DPS vs Payout ratio ................................................................................................................................................. 9 
Figure 28:  Interest Coverage Ratio vs EBIT (in millions) .............................................................................................. 9 
Figure 29:  Gross Debt vs EBITDA ............................................................................................................................................ 9 
Figure 30: Risk Matrix ............................................................................................................................................................... 10 
Figure 31: Average annual temperature in Portugal by season ................................................................................ 10 
Figure 32: COR’s ESG score (overall 39) ............................................................................................................................. 11 
Figure 33: Family business corporate governance model ........................................................................................... 11 
Figure 34: Remuneration of the BoD (in hundreds) ...................................................................................................... 11 
 
  
 VII 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1: COR’s market data ......................................................................................................................................................... 1 
Table 2: Impact on COR’s Price Target from change in worldwide wine consumption CAGR ......................... 1 
Table 3: COR’s trading data ........................................................................................................................................................ 4 
Table 4: Wine consumption by type of packaging ............................................................................................................. 5 
Table 5: COR's recent M&A activity ......................................................................................................................................... 6 
Table 6: COR’s Enterprise Value ............................................................................................................................................... 8 
Table 7: EV contribution per BU ............................................................................................................................................... 8 
Table 8: COR’s Price Target ........................................................................................................................................................ 8 
Table 9: COR’s WACC..................................................................................................................................................................... 8 
Table 10: COR’s liquidity ratios ................................................................................................................................................. 9 
Table 11: Sensitivity analysis for the arroba price ......................................................................................................... 10 
Table 12: Sensitivity analysis for the Terminal Growth Rate ..................................................................................... 10 
Table 13: Monte Carlo Simulation ......................................................................................................................................... 10 
Table 14: Some of the Amorim Family Investments ...................................................................................................... 12 
 
 
 
 1 
    
Corticeira Amorim S.G.P.S., SA 
 Forest & Wood Products - Cork 
This report is published for educational purposes only by students Portuguese Stock Exchange (PSI) 
competing in The CFA Institute Research Challenge 
 
Date: 31/12/2018 Current Price: 9.00 Recommendation: BUY (21% Upside) Medium-Risk 
Ticker: COR.LS (Bloomberg) EUR 1.000: USD 1.145 Price Target: EUR 10.9 (USD 12.48) 2019YE 
COR: The implied dividend policy as a way of 
protecting minority interests 
Research Snapshot 
We issue a BUY recommendation for Corticeira Amorim S.G.P.S., SA (COR) with a price target of €10.9/sh for 
2019YE using a DCF model, implying a 21% upside potential from the December 31st, 2018 closing price of 
€9.00/sh, with medium-risk. COR is a mature company with a dominant market position of 44% in the cork 
stoppers business worldwide. The company has been recovering from tough years in the supply side, with raw 
material prices rising 24.4% in the last two years. The company adapted to these market changes by anticipating 
purchases of cork mostly for the stoppers’ division. COR also engaged in M&A activity to increase capacity, to 
enhance market share and to consolidate new markets. The upsurge in wine consumption, especially from 
premium wines, should position COR in a track of steady growth in the coming years, allowing an attractive 
dividend. 
Leading the game, setting the rules. COR is the undisputed leading provider of cork stoppers worldwide with a 
44% market share, benefiting from having 34% of the cork oak forestry located in Portugal. The company is a 
price setter which is reflected in the stability of margins in the cork stoppers division. COR’s size and longstanding 
relations with suppliers yield a competitive edge in the race for limited resources. Hence, high barriers to entry 
lead us to expect many additional years of COR dominance ahead.  
Steady growth and stable margins. Wine consumption worldwide is COR’s main revenue driver with an 
expected growth of 3.2% CAGR 2017-23. The increase in consumption of premium wines will raise the average 
selling price of cork stoppers by +1.0% CAGR from 2019-23, and together with increases in the global drinking 
age population should set growth for sales at 4.4% CAGR from 2018-23.  
The price of raw materials skyrocketed +24.4% in 2016 to 2018 due to gaps in the harvesting cycle. Our research 
point that local producers forecast a decrease of ~10% in price to further stabilize around €33 per arroba (~15kg 
cork bark). The stabilization should drive gross margins up, recovering at ~51.5% from 2020F onwards. EBITDA 
margin will restore to 18%-19%, enabling a steady cash flow generation. COR’s strong cash from operations 
(€110M-€130M) will comfortably cover anticipated CAPEX and the growing dividend policy. We expect a DPS up 
to €0.5 in 2023F with an average payout ratio of 69.5% 2019-23. 
Mature, solid, and adaptable. During the late 1990s, COR’s existence was put to the test due to the rising ‘’tainted 
wine’’ issue. In those years, alternative closures emerged, pushing cork industry to its knees. The cork industry 
for closures tumbled from ~90% to ~60% market share, threatened to be overthrown by synthetic/plastic 
stoppers and screwcaps. However, the bad years in tainted wine by cork appear to be gone for good. COR’s 
investments in innovation (~€7.5M/year) offered the solution that dispelled dark clouds away and molded the 
company that we know today – mature, solid, and adaptable. 
The implicit dividend policy. The majority ownership of the Amorim family creates hesitation on potential 
investors. COR is knowingly disregarding several corporate governance recommendations, downgrading its own 
governance score on Reuters’ ESG. Yet, despite the underlying corporate governance issues – lack of 
independence in the executive team, unclear remuneration policy, undefined dividend policy – COR is 
safeguarding minority shareholders’ interests as a way of protecting the family’s wealth.  
The family owns a diversified portfolio of investments, ranging from luxury to banking, that was partly 
accumulated during periods of strong cashflow distribution from the cork business. This is a clear indication that 
the Amorim family is using COR as a source of financing for diversification at the family level. Since they are 
entitled to ~75% of the distributed earnings, it is on their best interest to maintain a regular flow of dividends. 
This diversification strategy is inadvertently protecting minority interests through an implicit dividend policy. 
Table 1: COR’s market data 
Market Profile 
Closing price (December 31st)  € 9.0 
52-week price range  €8.4-€12.0  
Average daily volume 57,838 
Shares outstanding 133M 
Market Capitalization 1.2B 
Free float 25.1% 
Dividend yield(2018F) 2.4% 
Source: Reuters 
Table 2: Impact on COR’s Price Target 
from change in worldwide wine 
consumption CAGR 
    Price Target 
    € 10.9 
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-2.00% € 7.7 
-1.00% € 8.1 
0.00% € 8.5 
0.50% € 8.8 
1.00% € 9.1 
1.50% € 9.4 
2.00% € 9.8 
2.50% € 10.2 
3.00% € 10.6 
3.23% € 10.9 
3.50% € 11.1 
4.00% € 11.7 
 
Source: Team estimates 
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Figure 1:  COR’s Price Target 
 
* EV/Sales; EV/EBITDA 
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Figure 2: Market share in the cork 
stoppers industry 2017YE 
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Business Description  
Corticeira Amorim SGPS SA (COR) is a Portuguese cork manufacturer, primarily focused on the production of cork 
stoppers. Founded in 1870 as a family business, the group has maintained its core vision throughout the years of 
adding value to cork in a sustainable and innovative way. COR has been the global market leader in this industry 
during roughly the last 148 years, and by 2018F sold 5.7B units of cork stoppers, accounting for 44% of the 
worldwide market for cork stoppers. 
The cork manufacturing business started in 1870 with the production of cork stoppers, which to this day still 
represents the main engine of profitability and growth for COR. By 1935, the company initiated its vertical 
integration strategy, eliminating upstream suppliers by purchasing the raw material itself and transforming it 
into usable cork. In the 1970s, COR opened its first factory dedicated to floor and wall coverings, thus entering 
the construction sector. The company first issued shares in 1988. Currently, COR is divided into 5 business units 
(BUs) – Raw Materials (1.6% 2017YE Sales), Cork Stoppers (67.3%), Floor and Wall Coverings (16.8%), 
Composite Cork (12.9%) and Insulation Cork (1.4%). COR sees its international expansion as a leading strategy, 
as exports represented 95% of 2017YE sales.  
COR has performed several acquisitions throughout its history. In 1989, it acquired the Swedish Wicanders, a 
company in the coverings industry. This acquisition allowed the diversification of the coverings’ portfolio, 
through a premium and innovative brand, and to expand the BUs distribution channels.  Wicanders has a strong 
presence in over 70 countries, particularly in central and northern Europe, allowing a higher penetration of COR’s 
products in these markets. More recently, in 2017, COR acquired 60% of French group Bourrassé, the third largest 
cork stopper manufacturer in the world (700M units in 2017) (Figure 8) and agreed to acquire the remaining 
40% in 2022. Bourrassé operates mainly in France, the world’s second largest wine consumer (16%) and 
producer (14.6%) and has high brand recognition in the country. Additionally, Bourrassé has subsidiaries in 
Portugal and in Chile, enabling COR to extend its facilities in Portugal and to strengthen its businesses in Latin 
America. In 2017 COR also acquired the French Sodiliège dedicated to stoppers for spirits, and in 2018 the 
portfolio was expanded with the acquisition of the former Swedish supplier Elfverson.  
In 2017, COR had total sales of €701.6M. Excluding the effect of the recent acquisitions of Sodiliège and Bourrassé, 
the company experienced +5.3% YoY organic growth to €675M. COR’s sales in 2017 were mainly concentrated in 
the EU region (62.5%), especially in the major wine consuming countries of France, Italy and Spain. The US market 
represented 18.5% of consolidated sales, followed by the other American countries (7.2%) and Asia-Pacific 
(5.9%) (Figure 4). The biggest markets for the Cork Stoppers BU were France (22%) and the USA (17%). COR is 
expected to generate €764.3M 2018F (+8.9% YoY) total sales but EBITDA will grow -0.3% with margin at 17.4%. 
This decrease in margins results from the incorporation of higher-priced raw materials purchased in 2017. 
However, trends per BU are not the same (Figure 5). 
The Cork Stoppers BU sales are expected to represent 70.1% of consolidated sales 2018F, growing +12.3% YoY, 
which translates into 5.7B stoppers sold. Additionally, COR intends to invest between €30-35M in CAPEX to 
extend the current capacity of the Cork Stoppers BU, as it currently operates at full capacity. The 2017 and 2018 
acquisitions already adjusted capacity up. The Raw Materials BU has the mission of guaranteeing the supply of 
cork to other BUs while assuring the preservation and sustainability of cork oak forests. About 95% of sales are 
to other BUs. Starting in 2017, as a way of diminishing the exposure to the secondary market, COR’s managers 
decided to increase purchases of cork bark to internalize more production. 
The Floor and Wall Coverings BU is expected to contribute to 14.8% of 2018F sales (-7.1% YoY). Among the main 
markets of this BU, Germany and Scandinavia are growing the most, while the US is experiencing a slowdown. 
EBITDA margin is expected to decrease to 2.9% due to the aforementioned underperformance of sales, although 
growing in the period 2019-2023 from 6.7% to 11.2%. Currently, the BU is operating at 80% of capacity.  
The Composite Cork BU with 13.4% of 2018F sales, EBITDA margin of 10.0% and contribution to 7.7% of COR’s 
consolidated EBITDA, focuses on reusing the waste produced by the Cork Stoppers BU, creating innovative 
products for 25 different industries. Our 2018F sales forecast reflects an increase in sales of 4.0% YoY. The 
Insulation Cork BU has the second smallest contribution to COR’s sales, at 1.5% of 2018F sales, representing 0.8% 
of consolidated EBITDA. The segment produces both thermal and acoustic cork agglomerate insulation, known 
for its high quality and natural properties. Sales are expected to increase +9.1% YoY, following the recovery of 
the construction industry.    
In October 2018, COR announced the acquisition of its first forest property (Herdade da Baliza), with 2,866 
hectares, in Castelo Branco, in the east of Portugal. The acquisition totaled €5.5M and is part of the Forestry 
Intervention Project – a long-term program aiming to assure the valorization, maintenance and preservation of 
cork-oak forestry in Portugal. In this property, COR will plant cork oak trees using the micro-irrigation and 
fertilization system and will function as a showcase for landowners to convince them to plant cork oak trees. 
Future acquisitions of forest property are not expected, as it would lower COR’s return on invested capital.   
Key drivers of profitability 
Consumption of bottled wine drives the bulk of demand for cork stoppers, as 65% of wine bottles worldwide are 
sealed with this type of closure. Wine consumption towards premium wines should increase the average selling 
price of cork stoppers and growth in population, especially in Asia, will demand higher volumes.  
Cork bark is the main input of the business. The raw material is harvested from cork oak trees, located exclusively 
in the Mediterranean basin. Each tree needs to grow for 43 years until it produces the amadia cork, used for cork 
stoppers. Harvesting cycles of 9 years have driven prices of cork bark up over the last 2 years (+9.7% 2017, 
+13.4% 2018) due to scarceness of resources (Figure 7). This trend should not persist, as cork prices are expected 
to decrease 10% in 2019F and stabilize from 2021F onwards, as more cork oaks will be available for harvesting. 
Trends in construction drive the other BU of COR. The ongoing recovery from the financial crisis will ferment the 
growth in the other segments of the company, especially for the Floor & Wall Coverings BU and Insulation BU. 
 
 
Figure 3: Consolidated sales by BU 
2018F (inside) vs 2023F (outside) 
 
Source: Team estimates 
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Company strategies  
R&D+I as a way of improving efficiency  
By 2017YE, the average annual investment in R&D totaled ~€7.5M, and this level of investment is expected to 
continue. R&D+I has been a key differentiation point for COR in the diversification and improvement of its 
products, yielding a clear competitive advantage over its peers. COR’s Rosa ® Mechanism is one example. 
Implemented at an industrial level in 2007, the mechanism was the main driver for the Cork Stoppers BU recovery 
following the entrance of screwcaps and synthetic stoppers during the 2000s. The mechanism detects the 
presence of Trichloroanisole (TCA – a naturally occurring fungus present in cork) on a batch of stoppers and 
allows the removal of the contaminated stoppers from the production. More recently, COR developed NDTech 
technology, a complement to Rosa ® Mechanism. NDTech enables individual quality control on cork stoppers, 
reducing the analysis time by 90%. It is fast, it is reliable, and results in material improvements to the final 
product. The first stage of TCA-free cork stoppers (below 0.5 nanograms/liter) was primarily directed at premium 
wines, yet plans are to expand to other wine segments. COR expected a high acceptance of the product, yet 
estimated sales of 50M units for 2018YE are still not significant for the overall BU results (less than 1% 
contribution). 
 
Vertical and Horizontal Integration  
Over the last 17 years, COR has been active in M&A with 11 target companies from all over the world (Table 5). 
Almost all these companies’ businesses belonged to the cork stoppers industry, although a few were related to 
coverings. Through these acquisitions, COR augmented its production capacity and reinforced its presence in 
several markets, by simultaneously decreasing direct competition. Currently, the company is running at full 
capacity on its closures segment. Around 70% of COR’s sales can be attributed to its own distribution channels. 
Therefore, the company controls the entire value chain from the manufacturing of cork, to the transportation and 
delivery to final consumers. This allows continuous quality control and direct contact with the final consumer, 
improving the image of the company and excellence of its products. Nevertheless, COR is highly dependent on 
cork availability and its suppliers.   
Shareholder Structure 
COR is a family-owned company, with the Amorim family controlling indirectly almost 75% of voting rights, with 
free-float at 25.14% as of 2016. To remain in compliance with the maximum percentage of voting rights allowed 
by the Portuguese Competition Authority (Article 20 of the Portuguese Securities Code - 25%), the ~75% of 
shares belonging to the Amorim family are dispersed through three companies: (1) Amorim Investimentos & 
Participações SGPS SA (51%) through Amorim SGPS, SA, Amorim Holding Financeira I SGPS, SA, and Amorim 
Holding Financeira II; (2) Investmark Holdings B.V. (13.78%) and (3) Amorim International Participations B.V. 
(10.09%) (Appendix 26). Historically, the Amorim family has always been present in COR’s governance 
committees, to ensure the protection of the family’s best interests. Moreover, there is no activist shareholder. 
Over the last 4 years, the shareholder structure has undergone some important changes. During September 2015, 
the company added shares to its free float by selling treasury stock, through a Seasoned Equity Offering. The aim 
was to increase liquidity and the proceeds were distributed as dividends. By 2016, Amorim International 
Participations B.V. and Investmark Holdings launched a private sale offer of 5% of their participation, adding 10% 
to the free-float. This rise in free float increased the volume of transactions, which consequently impacted the 
share price (Table 3). On December 2017, Amorim Investimentos & Participações SGPS SA incorporated Amorim 
Capital SA, which is already fully controlled. According to 2018S1, the shareholder structure has since remained 
unchanged. We do not foresee motivations from the family to find a buyer for the company because they use COR 
as a source of funding for diversification at the family level. 
Corporate Governance 
The company is 75% owned by the family Amorim and their members have been running it. Mr. António Amorim 
joined COR in 1989, having occupied several upper management positions within the Amorim Group before being 
appointed as CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors (BoD) in 2001. He holds a degree in International 
Commerce from the University of Birmingham. Mrs. Cristina Amorim Baptista, economist, serves as CFO and Vice 
Chairman of the Group, being also a non-executive member of the BoD.  
Board Structure and Remuneration Policy  
COR’s BoD is composed of 6 members, of whom 3 are non-executive, although it does not attempt to follow the 
Corporate Governance Code recommended by the Portuguese Securities Market Commission (CMVM) of 
including independent members in its structure. The company opted for having no independence in the BoD. 
Similar to the BoD, the Remuneration Committee is also entirely composed of non-independent members. The 
remuneration policy consists of a fixed plus a variable component (only for executive BoD members) based on 
performance levels attained during the latest financial year. In further detail, such bonuses are determined 
according to the individual’s role on the current result, as well as its contribution to the medium/long-term 
economic sustainability goals of the organization. 2017 figures point to a fixed remuneration of €0.78M of the 
BoD, of which €0.23M correspond to a performance-based premium. Yet, the dividends received from indirect 
participations on COR’s shareholder structure have not been disclosed (Appendix 28). 
Corporate Governance 
COR follows the Reinforced Latin Governance model in which the controlling shareholder – family – elect the 
following corporate body members to 3-year office terms: 
- Board of Directors – 6 members whose main responsibility is the approval and implementation of 
management decisions at a strategic level; 
- Executive Committee – 3 members who implement decisions made by the BoD and manage the ordinary 
business activity of the company; 
- Supervisory Board – 4 members (3 incumbent, 1 alternate) that supervise the overall management, may 
dismiss directors in specific situations and monitor the independence of the Statutory Auditor;  
- Statutory Auditor - Ernst & Young ensures the truthful presentation of the financial reporting since 2017; 
Figure 7: Average selling price of the 
highest quality cork amadia (€/@) 
 
Source: UNAC (2018) and team estimates 
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Figure 9: Avg. annual TCA detection (%) 
 
Source: Cork Quality Council (2018) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
6
2
0
1
7
Figure 8: No. of cork stoppers sold by top 
3 companies (in billions) 2017YE 
 
Note: Total market 12.5bn 2017YE 
Source: COR (2017) & OENEO (2017) 
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- Remuneration Committee – 3 members who define the remuneration policy to be applied, none of which 
belonging to the Amorim family.  
COR has been using CMVM Corporate Governance Recommendations as a benchmark to review its own model 
since 1999. Up to the moment, the company fully complies with 26 of the mentioned 43 recommendations. The 
lack of independence of the BoD and of the Remuneration Committee, along with the unclear remuneration policy, 
represents the main corporate governance risks that minority shareholders are exposed to. The 
one-share-one-vote policy does not jeopardize minority shareholders rights in the company by allowing them to 
participate in important decisions of the company. However, the family’s super-majority control prevents them 
from exercising a meaningful influence.  
Despite the concentration ownership and lack of independence of the executive team, we do not consider that 
COR is a poorly governed family firm. The company has been showing sustained growth, enhanced by the 
management team’s expertise in the business. Additionally, COR is regularly distributing value to all investors 
through dividends. Our view is that family’s best interest is to have an active dividend policy while not 
jeopardizing COR’s potential to grow. The Amorim family owns a diversified portfolio of investments (e.g., 33.3% 
GALP with mkt value of €3.5B, 32.6% Estoril-Sol) (Appendix 20) that were accumulated in periods of strong cash 
flow distribution from the cork business. The apparent policy of distribution of dividends for diversification at 
the family level is inadvertently also protecting minority interests. 
Social Responsibility  
Regarding Bloomberg’s ESG rating, COR’s score of 56.2 outperforms its peers’ average of 33.94. COR’s 
sustainability strategy meets 11 of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) proposed by the United Nations, 
reflecting the company’s continuous effort in combatting social, economic and environmental issues.  Socially, the 
company is involved with a number of institutions dedicated to supporting local communities and those in need.  
Environmentally, COR has been actively committed to develop and promote the adoption of sustainability 
principles as well as forest management practices aimed at preserving the cork ecosystem and overall 
environment.  The primary areas of concern are the reduction of CO2 emissions and cork oak reforestation 
through the 2013 Forest Intervention Program. COR holds the Forest Stewardship Council Chain-of-Custody 
certification as well as several ISO certifications.  
Industry Overview and Competitive Positioning 
Cork industry and the Portuguese dominance 
Cork oak trees provide bark for the cork industry in a sustainable process that does not require cutting the tree. 
The oak forestry is spread throughout the Mediterranean Basin (Figure 11), totaling an area of 2.2M hectares. 
About 34% of Mediterranean oaks are in Portugal, providing a competitive advantage for Portuguese players. 
Annual cork production worldwide is around 201.4 thousand tonnes, 50% of which originates in Portugal. From 
the total cork bark harvested, 40% is immediately used for natural cork stoppers, 30% is destined for disks and 
blocks used in technical stoppers, while the rest are by-products (25%) and pieces (5%) (Figure 12).  
Natural cork stoppers are the priciest, ranging from €1 to €2/unit, as they are made from a single piece of cork. 
These serve as a sealing option mainly for still wines, being the preferred closure for premium wines. Technical 
stoppers are made from agglomerated (grinded) cork, being less expensive (starting at €0.02/unit) and directed 
for lower-priced wines. Around 70% of the production of cork is destined for the wine industry while the rest is 
divided between the construction sector (26%) and other cork products (4%) (APCOR, 2018). By 2017YE, the 
size of the world’s cork exports was close to €1.6B, with Portugal as the top exporter (62.4%), followed by Spain 
(18.6%) and France (5.1%).  
The cork industry is very fragmented on a company level yet geographically concentrated, with 80% of the 
companies located in Portugal. However, the whole industry is dominated by the Portuguese company COR, with 
~44% of global market share for cork stoppers, followed by the French OENEO, with around 20% of market share. 
Additionally, COR recently acquired the third player, Bourrassé, with a market share of 6%. 
The wine closures market 
Wines bottles can be sealed with three types of closures: cork stoppers (natural and technical – 67.2% of wines), 
plastic stoppers (8.6%) and screwcaps (24.2%).  In 2017, the global wine market output added up to 18.6B bottles 
of wine, of which 12.5B were sealed with cork, 4.5B with screwcaps and 1.6B with plastic stoppers. (Figure 13) 
Within the mentioned closures, cork stoppers are perceived as the highest quality option in countries with the 
highest wine consumption, being often associated with premium wines. Studies conducted by CTR Market 
Research (2017), have found that about 97% of consumers in China associate wines sealed with cork stoppers as 
having higher-quality, and the same conclusion was found in several other key markets (US – 97%, Spain – 95%, 
Italy – 86%, France – 83%). Consumers are willing to pay an average premium of 36% for cork-sealed wines over 
those with alternative closures. Screwcaps and plastic stoppers, on the other hand, consist of a more affordable 
and practical option, commonly used in cheaper wines and other alcoholic beverages. 
During the 1990s, cork stoppers were the dominant choice for wine closures, with over 90% of market share. 
However, concerns regarding TCA presence in cork stoppers and its negative impact on wines’ flavor and aroma 
started building up as 5% of all bottled wines sealed with cork were tainted (Figure 9). This led cork stoppers to 
lose market share during the first decade of the millennium in favor of alternative closures. Synthetic stoppers 
and screwcaps took advantage and gained market share in the wine stoppers business, taking over 40-50% of 
market share. The highest level of acceptance of screwcaps was found in Australia and New Zealand. Among the 
countries with the highest consumption of wine, the screwcaps acceptance was the highest in the UK (52% in 
2013), Germany (47% in 2013) and USA (43% in 2013).  Developments in TCA screening technology allowed the 
natural cork to regain winemakers’ trust, as nowadays only 0.5% of wines acquire the ‘corky’ flavor associated 
with TCA. Currently, cork stoppers account for close to 65% of the closures market for wine bottles, with high 
acceptance levels from both wine producers and the final consumer. There is no evidence regarding a new 
alternative closure to enter the market.  
Figure 11: Location of the cork oak 
forestry 
 
Source: APCOR (2018) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12:  Uses of cork bark 
 
Source: APCOR (2018) 
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Table 3: COR’s trading data 
  Avg daily 
volume 
traded 
Avg closing 
price 
2013 9 630              2.04 €  
2014 14 211              2.85 €  
2015 50 122              4.36 €  
2016 42 188              7.32 €  
2017 75 319            11.07 €  
2018 57 838 10.60 € 
Source: COR (2018) and Thomson Reuters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13:  Wine closures market  
(in billion units) 
 
Source: APCOR (2018) and team 
estimates 
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Demand Drivers  
Economic Outlook  
GDP per capita and Household Disposable Income (HDI) per capita are linked since consumption is a key factor 
for the growth of GDP. Historically, HDI and GDP had a positive correlation (Figure 14). Expansionary public 
policies can influence the aggregated demand mainly through two mechanisms: (1) the cut of taxes; and (2) the 
increase of government spending and a decrease of interest rates. The implementation of any of these policies 
generates a positive impact in HDI. Global GDP is expected to grow +5.1% CAGR from 2018-23.  China is expected 
to grow the most with a 7.8% CAGR from 2018-23, while the US and Europe will follow behind at 3.8% and 3.9%, 
respectively (IMF , 2018). With the increased availability of income, the consumption of luxury goods rises. In the 
US, sales of luxury goods are expected to grow at 2% YoY, which includes fine and premium wines (SVB, 2018). 
In vino veritas  
Wine consumption is the main demand driver for the cork industry, with cork stoppers representing 70% of the 
industry. The value of the global wine market was USD 302.02B 2017YE, with an expected CAGR of +3.2% from 
2017-23 to about USD 423.59B by 2023YE (Shah, 2017). In 2017, the world’s wine consumption totaled 243 mhl, 
65% of which was bottled wine (OIV , 2018). Almost 50% of the consumption can be linked to five countries – the 
USA, France, Italy, Germany and China (Figure 15). The consumption of wine decreased after the subprime crisis 
but has stabilized since at around 241mhl. We expect an increase in consumption over the forecasted period as a 
result of the growing middle-class population. The middle-class has an increased availability of disposable income 
(Kochhar, 2017), which is positively correlated to wine consumption. According to Kharas (2017), the global 
middle-class will grow at +4.6% CAGR from 2016-22, especially in China (+10.4% CAGR from 2016-22). 
Additionally, consumers are shifting their preferences from lower-priced towards premium wines (see Appendix 
21 for more detailed information by region). For the cork stoppers industry this translates into a preference for 
natural cork stoppers. 
Unlike wine consumption, the production of wine is very unstable as it is very sensitive to weather conditions. In 
2017YE, global wine production decreased by 8.6% YoY mainly due to adverse temperatures in the EU, reaching 
historical lows. From the total wine production of 250mhl 2017YE, over 50% originated in four countries, which 
also correspond to some of the leading countries in wine consumption – Italy (17.20%), France (16.45%), Spain  
(14.50%) and the USA (8.48%) (Figure 16). Wine is an example of a product with constant demand but the 
production that is variable and tied to the harvest of grapes. The harvest is expected to recover during 2018, 
boosting wine production at +12% YoY 2018F. (OIV , 2018) 
Though production is heavily dependent on the harvest, historically, the production of wine always surpasses its 
consumption (Figure 17). For this reason, vineyards and winemakers estimate their sales of bottled wine based 
on forecasted consumption. The excess production is used for industrial purposes, such as wine vinegar and 
distillations of wines. Therefore, we forecast orders for cork stoppers to follow a similar trend to that of wine 
consumption. 
Construction Industry  
The global construction industry amounted to USD 10.6T total sales at 2017YE and is expected to continue a 
recovery path during the 2018-2022 period. Increasing urbanization, improved economic conditions and growing 
population will act as key drivers of growth, with a CAGR of +3.6% for the forecasted period and a total market 
value of USD 12.7 trillion by 2022YE (Global Data, 2018). Asia-Pacific should preserve its leading position, yet at 
a slower pace of growth due to the expected slowdown of the Chinese construction industry (see Appendix 22 for 
more detailed information per region). 
Supply Outlook  
Raw material Outlook 
The operations of the cork industry rely on the availability of this natural resource. To understand the level of 
uncertainty, we carried out a survey on the supply side (Appendix 25). The quantity of cork extracted is unstable 
since it depends on several factors, like extraction cycles and changes in weather conditions. Besides these 
concerning situations, cork oak trees are not considered to be endangered as the harvesting is controlled by the 
cork industry and the Portuguese government to ensure its maintenance and continuity. For the past two years, 
the total amount of cork bark available for harvesting decreased, mainly due to unsmoothing of the 9-year 
harvesting cycles. Nevertheless, the harvest of cork bark is expected to ease during 2019, returning to previous 
levels. Moreover, according to COR, there is enough cork to satisfy all demand for the following 100 years, if the 
total area of Montados does not decrease (APCOR, 2018). 
Wildfires pose a problem for this industry as they delay the harvest of the burned trees. Even though these trees 
are highly resistant to elevated temperatures, due to their humidity content, the Portuguese government imposes 
some rules to assure their perseverance. According to Decreto Lei nº 155/2004, after being affected by fires cork 
oaks must recover for a minimum of one year before the harvest of the bark is allowed. However, the risk of fires 
is not significant in the main area of Montados (Figure 18). Another issue to be considered is climate change 
(Figure 31), especially the increase in droughts. The scarcity of water has a negative impact on the quality of cork 
barks, making the trees less resistant to diseases and consequently more prone to die. However, this effect might 
be mitigated with the implementation of a micro-irrigation and fertilization system.  
Cork price 
The price of cork bark is influenced by several factors. The type of cork will dictate its quality. Cork oak trees need 
to grow for 25 years before they start producing cork. The first harvest will yield virgin cork which is very hard 
to handle due to its irregularities. This cork is destined for applications other than stoppers and is the cheapest 
type of cork. After 9 years, the tree is ready for its second harvest. Secondary cork is softer and less irregular than 
virgin cork, but still not suitable for cork stoppers. After the 3rd harvest, Mediterranean oaks produce the highest 
quality cork, known as amadia or reproduction cork. The average price for amadia cork 2017YE was €33.51 per 
arroba (~15kg) (Figure 7). 
The price of cork is also influenced by extraction costs. Extracting the bark of an oak tree is a highly specialized 
job and labor intensive. The process is completely dependent on human labor and is unlikely to be automatized. 
Extraction costs at 2017YE totaled €4.37 per arroba (+4.3% YoY) (Figure 19). For COR, a rise in extraction costs 
Figure 15:  Wine consumption in 2017 
(in mhl) 
 
Source: OIV (2017) 
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Figure 16:  Top 4 wine producing 
countries in 2017 (in mhl) 
 
Source: OIV (2017) 
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Figure 17:  Wine consumption vs wine 
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Source: OIV (2017) 
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packaging 
 
Type Volume 
Bottled + sparkling 65% 
Bulk and >2L 35% 
Source: OIV (2017) 
 
Figure 14:  GDP vs Household Disposable 
Income (HDI) vs Wine Consumption in 
the US 
 
Source: OIV (2017) & OECD (2019) 
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would not hurt the company’s performance, because these can be passed to consumers through an improved 
product mix.  
Finally, cork price is influenced by the big players in the industry, COR and OENEO. These companies are price 
setters, and smaller companies can only negotiate around the pre-defined value.   
Production Process and dependence on human labor 
The process of transforming cork bark into cylinder stoppers relies heavily on human labor. Cork oak trees are 
harvested between May and August. To remove the bark from the tree, harvesters carefully perforate the oak with 
the assistance of axes and remove the cork by hand. This is a highly specialized craft and takes years of experience 
to harvest the cork without damaging the tree. Cork bark is then transported to storage facilities where it is boiled, 
to increase softness and flexibility, and washed. Afterward, the cork is left outside to rest for 6 months to absorb 
humidity.  After the 6-month rest, the cork is ready for processing. In factories, cork bark is cut into thick strips 
from which natural cork stoppers are produced. With the aid of a cutting machine, workers chose where to punch 
the cork, based on its pores, and manually identify and dispose of stoppers that fail to meet the quality 
requirements. Technical stoppers and other cork products are produced from the grinded cork that comes from 
the thin cork bark and from the natural cork stoppers’ production waste. 
The heavy duty of punching the stoppers has already been automated, however this automation technique is still 
not fully utilized. Whereas one worker can produce, on average, 14,000 stoppers per day, the machine can more 
than double this amount to 30,000 stoppers by working around the clock. Companies may feel compelled to invest 
in this machinery as these can run for 24 hours nonstop, which greatly increases output. Shortage of qualified 
labor force may also be a decisive factor, as the craft is becoming every year more obsolete.  
Acquisition Activities  
Over the years, COR has made some important acquisitions which allowed them to reinforce their position in the 
market (Table 5). More recently, the company acquired Bourrassé (2017), Sodiliège (2017) and Elfverson (2018). 
Bourrassé was considered the 3rd largest producer of cork stoppers in the world, with a well-known brand and 
high-quality products. The company had operations in France, Spain, Italy and Chile. Additionally, Bourrassé had 
the loyalty of several important clients in the French market, constraining COR’s performance in this key market. 
With this acquisition, COR was able to reinforce its presence in France, which is now the most significant market 
for cork stoppers. Sodiliège, also a French-based company, was acquired by COR during 2017, with the goal of 
expanding the company’s portfolio to include high-quality personalized stoppers with bartops made from varied 
materials, like metal, glass and wood. In 2018, COR acquired 70% of the Swedish Elfverson to improve its spirits’ 
segment. Elfverson was a former supplier of COR, providing wood tops for the Cork Stoppers BU.  
COR does not expect to engage in M&A activities in the near future. However, future tactical acquisitions are not 
excluded by the company. If any smaller company with strong brand awareness and customer loyalty appears, it 
may come through as an option for COR. Still, we do not expect any future M&A activity from the company. Yet, a 
possible acquisition between the 2nd and 3rd largest players could pose as a potential threat to COR’s leadership, 
since the combined company would have ~25% market share (see Appendix 23 for more detailed information). 
Competitive Positioning  
Although cork is a very versatile product, it is mainly used to seal wines (70%). The market for cork stoppers is 
best described as a monopolistic competition with some oligopolistic features. The presence of many sellers does 
not restrain the pricing power of the two main players – COR and OENEO. Collectively, these two own over 60% 
of the market, primarily as a result of product differentiation strategies.   
Rivalry Among Existing Competitors 
Within the cork industry, the rivalry between competitors varies significantly. Among smaller companies, the 
product offered is quite homogeneous because of low R&D investments. The small size prevents them from 
benefiting from economies of scale and having an advantage over pricing, which makes rivalry quite high. 
Contrarily, COR and OENEO offer highly differentiated products. Their dimension allows them to be more 
competitive and offer better, more specialized solutions for their clients. Both companies benefit from high brand 
recognition, competing mainly amongst themselves, yet COR has a clear advantage of having more than double 
OENEO’s market share (Figure 8). Overall, and considering the two main players own over 60% of the market, 
the existing rivalry is low although it is more intense between smaller players. 
Threat of substitute products  
Following the developments of the TCA screening technology, cork stoppers have been the unquestionable 
leaders in the wine closures market, with over 65% market share, followed by screwcaps and plastic stoppers. 
Still, screwcaps acceptance has been growing in some markets, especially in the UK and Australia. Nevertheless, 
around 90% of consumers prefer cork-sealed wines (APCOR, 2018). Furthermore, there is no evidence regarding 
the appearance of new substitutes capable of cannibalizing the market share of cork stoppers.  
Bargaining power of suppliers 
Cork suppliers are mostly small family-owned companies that possess cork oak forest and/or are in the business 
of the cork oak extraction. Although cork oak forests are present only in the limited area of the Mediterranean 
basin, the power of the two dominant cork buyers (COR and OENEO) is so high that it often overwhelms the 
scarcity effect. Our analysis suggests that long-term contracts exist between main players and owners of Montados 
cork oak forests. 
Bargaining power of customers 
Packaging represents a small portion of the cost of a wine bottle (on average £0.36 in the UK in 2016) (Figure 21). 
When deciding on the type of sealing option, wineries will consider both the price and the customers' preferences. 
Therefore, switching costs are quite significant as, on average, 90% of consumers associate cork-sealed wines 
with quality. Yet, cork stoppers producers face an elastic demand which narrows down their ability to increase 
prices. Wineries may opt for cheaper alternative closures if the price of cork is too high. 
 
 
Figure 18:  Risk of fires in Portugal vs 
Location of Montados 
 
Source: ICNF (2017)& Árvores de 
Portugal (2017) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19:  Average extraction costs per 
year (€/@) 
 
Source: UNAC - União da Floresta 
Mediterrânica (2018) 
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Table 5: COR's recent M&A activity 
Year €M % Company 
2008 3.3 100 Cortex 
2008 7.1 25 US Floors 
2011 2.3 50 Corchos de Argentina 
2012 15.1 91 Trefinos 
2017 3.0 100 Sodiliège 
2017 29.0 60 Bourrassé 
2018 5.5 70 Elverson 
2022 19.0 40 Bourrassé* 
* Financial obligation. See Appendix 10 
Source: COR (2017) 
 
Figure 20:  Porter’s Five Forces 
 
Source: Team analysis 
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Figure 21:  Bottled wine price 
breakdown by type of wine, in the UK 
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Threat of new entrants 
Even though there is a vast number of small companies, barriers for new entries are high. Cork producers keep 
longstanding business relations with suppliers, as the amount of cork bark harvested changes every year. It would 
be difficult for a new player entering the market to establish these sorts of relations with suppliers, especially 
when two companies dominate the market. Furthermore, as the cork industry is constrained geographically, any 
company would have to assure its dominance in Portugal to overpower COR and change the current market 
structure. Additionally, the existing companies would most likely retaliate by reducing prices, making it harder 
for a new player to keep up.  
Investment Summary 
Our recommendation for Corticeira Amorim stands for BUY, with a price target of €10.9€/sh for 2019YE, which 
implies an upside potential of +21% from December 31st, 2018 closing price of 9.00€/sh. COR is trading at 
discount mostly due to the growing pressure of rising prices of raw materials (cork bark) of 24.4% in the period 
of 2016-2018. On the supply side, COR should experience relief of pressure from prices of raw materials. 
Additionally, devotion to R&D secures safe prospects, diminishing threats from tainted wine. COR’s dominant 
market position (44% market share), the positive outlook for wine consumption pushed by preferences for 
cork-sealed wines, especially high-end wines (3.2% CAGR from 2017-23), and the ability to sustain a growing 
dividend policy through strong cash-flow generation from operations should drive COR’s price up during 2019. 
Key Value Drivers 
COR is the market leader in the cork industry, with a 44% market share, followed with the French OENEO’s 
20% and the Portuguese family company M.A.Silva with 4.8% (Figure 8). The market share was improved in 2017 
by 5.6% with the €48M (premium of ~45%) acquisition of Bourrassé. This acquisition fortifies COR’s position in 
France, the second largest wine producer worldwide. COR has its presence in all world’s wine-production relevant 
markets – France, Italy and Spain. Also, the company benefits from the loyal and long-standing relationships with 
suppliers, and the ability to influence prices. The recent shortage of cork during 2016 and 2018 and rising prices 
in the period of +24.4% to ~38€ per arroba is an example. COR accumulated inventories a year ahead, buying at 
a cheaper price, and gross margins in 2018-19 adjusted to 49.3% (only -390 bps decrease YoY). The stabilization 
of the price of high-quality cork (amadia) at ~€33 will allow COR to return to margins around 51%-52% 2021-23. 
Wine consumption will drive COR’s value up. The trend of premiumization in wine consumption will increase 
COR’s average selling price by +1.0% CAGR from 2019-23. Historically, the growth was higher by +140 bps as 
the cork stoppers industry recovered from the development of synthetic/plastic stoppers and screwcaps as 
alternative closures. Nowadays, increasing preferences towards cork closures will also benefit COR’s sales in this 
mature industry. Additionally, the rise in the global middle-class population by +4.6% CAGR from 2018-22, 
especially in China (+10.4% CAGR from 2018-22), will boost the total wine consumption to +17.9% from 2017 in 
2023F and so volume for cork stoppers. Preferences towards high-end wines together with the rising population 
will justify COR’s growth of 4.4% CAGR during 2018-23. Yet, the recent trade war is not expected to jeopardize 
COR’s prospects in the medium-term. 
Cork Stoppers BU (EBITDA margin 18.2% in 2023F) is the leading contributor to COR’s sales with 73.5% in 2023F, 
followed by F&W coverings (13.3%), Composites (11.9%) and Insulation (1.5%). The Floor & Wall Coverings BU 
and the Insulation BU are merely niche players in the construction industry (CAGR of 3.6% in 2018-2022). By 
2023F we anticipate EBITDA margin improvements for Coverings (11.2%) and preservation in the case of 
Composites (13.9%) through its diversified nature - exposed to roughly 25 industries.  
The relief of pressure from raw materials price will support the generation of a steady operating cash flow 
around €110M-€130M during 2019F-23F. The price of cork bark is expected to stabilize at ~€33 in 2021F, after 
a period of higher volatility. The increased availability of cork oaks ready for harvesting will drive prices back to 
more normal levels, although above the ones experienced in 2016 (~€30.6). The normalization in the arroba’s 
price, together with the increase in the average selling price of cork stoppers and increased volume, will drive 
COR’s gross margins back up to 52% in 2023F. Furthermore, operating profit will grow by +6.3% CAGR from 
2018-23, above sales figures.  
Strong financial position for attractive expansions ahead. The suboptimal capital structure that puts COR’s 
debt levels at 10% (D/EV) is the result of a powerful company in a growing and fairly stable industry. That leaves 
a noteworthy room for financing future business opportunities. Robust cash generation from operations provides 
a cushion for market shocks and puts COR in a comfortable position.  
Success demands planning. COR is strongly committed to innovation (~€7.5M/year) giving it a strong 
foundation for the future. Its longstanding history of successful combat against tainted wine (TCA), industry’s 
number 1 enemy, confirmed COR’s resilience and adaptability in a period of bad winds. Everything started with 
the Rosa ® Mechanism (2007) and continued very recently with NDTech (2016). Despite the tiny portion of 
overall sales (50M stoppers) in 2018F from NDTech, we see it as an important factor for COR’s preservation of 
market dominance, especially in the market for fine wines. 
 
Reaping the synergies from M&As. Recent acquisitions of Bourrassé (2017) and Sodiliège (2017) allowed COR 
to put a bigger foot in the French wine market. The 2017 acquisitions have room for target’s EBITDA margins 
improvement (Bourrassé – 13.1% and Sodiliège – 4.22%), which unleashes our estimated potential synergy 
(~€50M) from margins convergence throughout the years in both acquisitions. The consolidation of synergies 
would drive COR’s value up to ~€0.3/sh, on top of the TP. We explore potential M&A involving COR, OENEO and 
M.A. Silva but, despite potential relevant operational and financial synergies with the latter as a target, the 
probability for a successful takeover is limited. 
Figure 23:  COR’s avg. selling price per 
stopper vs avg. cost per stopper 
Source: Team estimates 
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Figure 25:  Total CAPEX vs Sales 
Source: COR (2017) and team estimates 
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Valuation methods 
We computed COR’s Enterprise Value using a FCFF model, achieving a target price of €10.9/sh. To complement 
our analysis, we used FCFE, reaching €10.8/sh, the DDM, yielding €10.6/sh, and the Residual Income, through 
which we obtained a target price of €9.7/sh. Multiples are fairly difficult to rely for COR because of its leading 
position and that only OENEO is here the only peer. Forward price multiples (P/B, P/E and P/S) set COR’s price 
at €9.2/sh and enterprise multiples (EV/S and EV/EBITDA) yield €9.8/sh, all above current COR’s stock price. 
Risks to achieve the price target  
COR’s margins are highly sensitive to increases in the price of raw materials. Investors should take into account 
the impact of changes in wine consumption on the sales of the BU for cork stoppers, which represent roughly 
70% of total sales. Exchange rates are still a major concern for COR, especially the EUR/USD, affecting close to 
one-fifth of sales. China is a player in the wine consumption growth and the current trade war puts the cork 
business outlook unpredictable. Other BU yield risks but of smaller magnitude. The performance of the Floor & 
Wall Coverings BU is still uncertain, as the BU recovers from restructuring and change of management.   
 
Valuation   
DCF Approach: Different Methods, Similar Upside  
To value COR, we used Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF) as our main cash-flow proxy to estimate the target price 
of €10.9/sh. Additionally, as we do not expect changes in COR’s capital structure and the company has a growing 
absolute payout, the analysis is complemented with the Free Cash Flow to Equity (FCFE) and the Dividend 
Discount Model (DDM). All methods point COR’s value per share in 2019YE in the range €10.6-€10.9, all providing 
room for upside and leading us to the same BUY decision as an investment recommendation. The key factors 
influencing our valuation are the following:  
Wine consumption leads the way in the cork game 
The forecasted rise in wine consumption together with the increasing preferences for cork-sealed wines will 
boost COR’s sales, as the Cork Stoppers BU is the main engine of profitability (~70% total sales). The cork stoppers 
industry will grow at 4.0% CAGR from 2018-23, +80 bps above the forecasted growth for the entire wine closures 
industry. The leading market position along with recent and expected investments to increase capacity will enable 
COR’s closure segment to outperform the industry at +5.5% CAGR from 2018-23. The trending preferences 
towards consumption of fine wines are expected to contribute to COR’s average selling price by +1.0% YoY, from 
€0.094 in 2018F to €0.099 in 2023F (Figure 23).  
Other BU adding value. The Floor & Wall Coverings BU has been through a gloomy period. The 
underperformance of sales impacted EBITDA margins, reaching 2.9% in 2018F, -793 bps compared to 2016 
figures. Yet, COR’s management has taken a course of action, appointing a new management team for the BU and 
making the necessary restructurings. The positive outlook for the construction sector worldwide (3.6% CAGR 
from 2018-23) will help on the recovery of the BU, expected to grow at +2.3% CAGR 2018-23. The Insulation BU 
should follow the growth of the construction sector, while the Composites BU growth is more uncertain due to 
the exposure to 25 different industries.  As the segment is intended to create brand awareness, historical growth 
of +1.9% YoY should persist in the period 2018-23. 
Relief in the arroba’s price 
COR’s COGS are affected by the price of raw materials with a one-year lag (Figure 22). 2018 and 2019 figures are 
affected by the sharp increase in the price of cork bark during 2017 (+9.7%) and 2018 (+13.4%), reaching 
€38/arroba by 2018. Gross margin will take in these effects in 2019F, settling in at 49.3% -105 bps YoY. During 
the forecasted period, the price of cork is expected to decrease and stabilize at €33, as the quantity of cork oaks 
available for harvest increases. COR’s dominance over the cork industry will support this stabilization of costs for 
the company. The reduced arroba price starting in 2020 will positively affect COR’s gross margin, increasing up 
to 52.0% in 2023F.  
COR anticipated the rise in prices and took countermeasure actions by accumulating inventory a year ahead. In 
2017, inventories increased +33.7% YoY before accounting for the effect from the acquisition of Bourrassé and 
Sodiliège. These acquisitions climbed inventory levels, while the inventory turnover was less affected. Moreover, 
the internalization of the previously outsourced production of disks and blocks also contributed to this growth. 
The ease in prices together with the new production policy will return inventories to normal levels during 2019 
(-2.9% YoY). Afterward, inventories are expected to grow steadily at +3.3% CAGR 2019-23. 
Investing to grow 
The Cork Stoppers BU is currently operating at close to full capacity. Investment in CAPEX for 2018F is expected 
to jump to €50M, above the maintenance level of €20-25M. From the total investment, around €35M will be used 
to expand the current production line of wine stoppers. To support the expected growth of the company, we 
believe COR will invest, on average, ~€41M per year as total CAPEX. Depreciation & Amortization (D&A) are 
expected a threshold lower, accounting for a small room to grow organically.  
WACC Assumptions 
Cost of equity ranges from 6.2% to 8.3% in our valuation, applying the CAPM model. The market forecasts for 
the German 10-year bond yield is our benchmark for the RFR, ranging from 0.89% to 1.2% 2018-2023, yet in the 
terminal period, this rate was adjusted upward (2.9%) to account for the expected movement in the market for 
the yield curve in the long-run. The Beta of 0.72 is calculated through a regression of the company’s price with 
the PSI20, but the average of other two approaches point to similar figures. Even though only a small fraction of 
sales originate from Portugal (5.7% 2017YE), the majority of cork purchases (over 75%) and production facilities 
are located there. Due to this exposure, MRP is based on the relation between COR and the PSI20 and is equal to 
7.4% (Appendix 13). 
Table 6: COR’s Enterprise Value 
FCFF 2019F 2023F 
EBIT(1-tc) 67,659 96,546 
Non Cash 
Charges 31,695 38,113 
CAPEX&OtherInv. -37,809 -44,629 
∆ NWC 8,041 -8,757 
FCFF 69,586 81,272 
EV 1,581,058 
Source: Team estimates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: EV contribution per BU 
Enterprise Value breakdown 
   Raw Materials + Cork Stoppers 87% 
   Floor & Wall Coverings 6% 
   Composites 11% 
   Insulation 1% 
   Holding & Others -5% 
Source: Team estimates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: COR’s Price Target 
Price Target 
Enterprise Value 1,581,058 
 - Net Debt -95,474 
 - Other borr. & creditors -15,717 
 - Non-controlling interests -37,575 
 + Investments in associates 11,394 
Equity Value 1,443,686 
No. shares outstanding 133,000 
Price Target 10.9   
Share Price - 31 Dec, 2018 
             
9.00  
Upside Potential +21% 
Source: Team estimates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: COR’s WACC 
DCF Analysis 2019F Terminal 
Cost of Equity     
Risk Free Rate  0.9% 2.9% 
Beta (β) 0.72 0.72 
Market Premium 7.4% 7.4% 
Cost of Equity 6.2% 8.3% 
Cost of Debt     
Pre-tax Cost of Debt 1.7% 3.3% 
Tax Rate 29.8% 30.3% 
After-tax Cost of 
Debt 
1.2% 2.3% 
Weight of Equity 89.2% 90.0% 
Weight of Debt  10.8% 10.0% 
WACC 5.7% 7.7% 
Source: Team estimates 
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Cost of debt is coupled to the forecasted 6-month Euribor rate, which adjusts the spread paid by the company. 
The value ranges from 1.7% to 3.3% in the forecasted period (Appendix 12). COR has a target accounting 
Equity/Assets ratio of 40-50%, but, historical P/B yields market values of around 90/10%. Considering the 
forecasted P/B in the medium-term, the forecast that COR’s market capital structure will remain around 10% 
D/EV, leaving WACC to range from 5.7% to 7.7% (Appendix 13). 
Terminal Value Assumptions 
COR is a mature company, currently growing faster than the market. The strong market power, recent M&A 
activity, and increased consumer preferences toward cork stoppers are drivers, to name a few. We believe the 
company will preserve its unquestionable leadership, benefiting from its experience in an over a century old 
business and an everlasting wine market, growing unlevered cash flows at a +2.5% growth rate, which is 
consistent, yet conservative, with the expected growth rate of 4.4% CAGR 2019F-23F for the business. COR’s 
reinvestment rate along with its competitive position in the cork industry support these figures (Appendix 14). 
Every BU brings something to the table 
In a SoP approach, apart from splitting sales per segment, we estimated each BU’s EBITDA margin and 
contribution to the total (Appendix 8). This approach has caveats since needs for NWC are not disclosed nor 
discussed by the company, while peer analysis adds few to this. 
Dividend Policy 
COR does not establish a specific target payout. However, in previous years the company has paid both a regular 
and an extraordinary dividend, which we expect to be continued. The company will generate a significant amount 
of cash YoY on the period 2019F-2023F (18.2% CAGR) (Figure 26). In forecasted years, the payout ratio will 
converge to the historical average (~75%) and dividend yield will reach 3%-4%. 2019F will be an exception to 
the case, due to the peak in the arroba’s price, impacting earnings for that year (-1.8% YoY). After the troubled 
period, total dividend will gradually increase to €0.50/sh by 2023F (Figure 27). On top of that, the cash generated 
from operations will allow the company to pay down about €20.3 million interest-bearing debt.  
The one and only peer for valuation 
The Cork Stoppers BU is COR’s main engine of profitability, representing over 70% of consolidated sales 2018F. 
When selecting peers, the search for listed producers of cork stoppers is limited. OENEO is the only peer company 
listed in the same line of business. Likewise, the stoppers business represents the majority of OENEO’s sales, a 
company which is responsible for 20% of the global cork stoppers output in 2017YE (Appendix 19). 
Financial Analysis  
Cash Generation 
COR is a mature company that is now putting behind some rough years during which a lot of cash was tied in the 
working capital caused by raw material price increases. Just in 2017 and 2018, almost €41M was used for NWC 
in each year, after adjusting for the 3 M&As. In the period 2019-23, the relief from raw material pressure will 
translate into increases in the cash ratio from 0.04 in 2018F to 0.18 in 2023F. This is still below OENEO’s 0.51 
2017YE, which can be explained with COR’s higher dividend payout ratio (33.7% 2017YE compared to OENEO’s 
24.4% 2017YE). Other two liquidity indicators tell us similar story. Despite waning growth in inventories and 
receivables, the current ratio is dragged upward with increasing cash. Current ratio climbs from 2.01 in 2018F to 
2.15 in 2023F and quick ratio follows a similar pace, growing from 0.74 to 0.92 in the same period (Table 10). 
  
Mature company means stability 
The use of pricier raw materials purchased during 2017 and 2018 will inevitably affect COR’s performance in 
2018 and 2019 (49.3% gross margin 2019F, -390 bps from the 2017 figures). Anticipating further rises, COR 
registered a net increase in raw materials, which will slightly deteriorate inventory turnover in the short-term 
(1.02 in 2019-23 compared with 1.04 in 2018F). Overall, in 2019-23, cash conversion cycle is fairly stable at 
270-290 days, higher than OENEO’s number of 241 in 2017YE. Likewise, in the same period, working capital 
turnover remains stable at ~2.1, at a similar level to previous years. Total asset turnover is one more piece that 
tells the same story. As we would expect to see in a mature company, it barely moves, nesting at 0.85-0.90, but at 
a considerable higher level compared to OENEO (0.6 in 2017YE). 
 
Profitability  
COR has been showing an upward trend for profitability since 2015. EBITDA’s CAGR of 10.1% in 2012-17 
outpaced sales figures of 5.6% in the period, reflecting a +361 bps increase in EBITDA margin to 19.0% 2017YE. 
Shining enhanced operating performance is offset in 2018-19 by the cork price increase of 9.7% and 13.4% in the 
period 2017-18. Pressure on the EBITDA margin will be relieved from 2020 onwards, reflecting stability in the 
arroba’s price and higher average selling price in the Cork Stoppers BU. This BU will contribute to most of COR’s 
EBITDA with 72.4% by 2023F. The company’s stability in generating profits will allow a positive outlook for 
dividends distribution, while ROE will stabilize at 13%-14.5% in the next 4-5 years. 
Parts make up a whole 
The Cork Stoppers BU will set the pace for COR, yet the other BUs will closely follow behind. The Raw Materials 
BU will continue absorbing part of the cork bark price, preserving its EBITDA margins at ~13%. The Floor & Wall 
Coverings BU will soon recover from its slump, which resulted in a tiny EBITDA margin of 2.94% in 2018F. COR’s 
continuous efforts to revive this segment will yield positive results from 2020 onwards, reaching an EBITDA 
margin of 11.2% in 2023F. Even though COR is just a niche player in this segment, historically the company 
succeeded to keep margins up (~10%), aligned with Tarkett, its biggest European rival (€2.8B Sales 2017YE). 
The Composite BU produces goods to 25 different industries. By virtue of this diversification, we expect that the 
company will preserve margins during the forecasted period, similar to historical ones (13%-14%). Finally, the 
Insulation BU will continue to contribute ~1% to total sales, with EBITDA margin of 9.7% in 2023F (Appendix 8). 
 
Figure 27:  DPS vs Payout ratio 
 
Source: COR (2017) and team estimates 
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Figure 29:  Gross Debt vs EBITDA 
(in millions) 
 
Source: COR (2017) and team estimates 
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Table 10: COR’s liquidity ratios 
 2018F 2023F 
Cash Ratio 0.04 0.18 
Quick Ratio 0.74 0.92 
Current Ratio 2.01 2.15 
Cash Cycle Days 283 269 
Source: Team estimates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28:  Interest Coverage Ratio vs 
EBIT (in millions) 
 
Source: COR (2017) and team estimates 
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Financial Strength  
Gross debt should not evolve in the forecasted period. The industry is mature and growing, while the company is 
leading and is robust at generating value. The company has been deleveraging by 7.3% CAGR from 2012-17 to 
reach €109.8M gross debt. Activities have been financed through government grants (€22.6M) and earnings 
retention. Interest-bearing debt is expected to account for only 10.0% of total assets in 2023F. The growth in 
EBITDA (+5.8% CAGR from 2018-23), combined with COR’s ability to generate cash will drive Gross Debt/EBITDA 
down from 1.01 in 2018F to 0.64 in 2023F (Figure 29). The interest coverage ratio shows how financially strong 
COR is (40 to 56 during 2018-23) (Figure 28). We compute a Piotroski Score for COR of 5 in 2018F and 9 in 2023F, 
averaging 8.4 in the period (Appendix 33). The figures are the result of the recovery of the company through 
tougher years with improvement in margins and profitability. 
Investment Risks  
Market Risk | Wine Consumption (MR1) 
Global wine consumption is quite stable, slightly increasing every year. More recently, the industry has been 
experiencing a change in preferences from cheaper wines towards premium wines, due to shifting behavior of 
consumers. This change will benefit COR, boosting demand for natural cork stoppers. Moreover, COR registered 
an increase in sales of the still and sparkling wine segments 2017YE. The segments grew +7.3% and +5.1% YoY, 
respectively, against the slight increase of 0.4% on worldwide consumption. Furthermore, the premiumization of 
wine consumption is increasing the average selling price of COR (1% CAGR from 2018-23) as premium wines 
require high-end natural cork stoppers. A shift in behavior in the opposite direction could affect COR’s target price 
by €0.89/sh considering a -90% change in the forecasted wine consumption.  
Operational Risk | Availability of Resources (MR2) 
The industry is completely dependent on the availability of a natural resource. Cork-oaks are not considered to 
be endangered, as the cork industry controls the harvest to ensure the continuity and maintenance of the trees. 
Additionally, there is enough cork to satisfy the demand for the following 100 years. Furthermore, harvesting 
cycles affect the quantity of bark extracted every year. As the amount supplied decreases, prices of cork will 
increase to reach the economic equilibrium.  Cork is the main input for COR, meaning increasing costs of raw 
materials affect the profitability of the company. Therefore, the impact is high.  
Market Risk | Substitutes (MR5) 
The threat of the substitute products (screwcaps and synthetic stoppers) is decreasing in recent years by virtue 
of increasing consumer preferences toward cork stoppers (Figure 13). According to APCOR (2018), 90% of clients 
prefer cork-sealed wines. In many important wine markets, consumers are ready to pay a premium for wines 
sealed with cork ($3.87 in the US and $5.15 in China, according to Nielsen, 2017). Still, screwcaps have been 
growing in popularity in the wine closures market, experiencing +2.01% CAGR from 2011-2017. The market is 
expected to grow +3.2% CAGR from 2017-2023, in line with the expected growth in wine consumption. Its main 
producer, Guala, accounts for over 30% of the screwcaps market for wines and close to 7% of the total closures 
market (1.35B units). The company is the leader in Australia and New Zealand, where 70% and 93% of wines, 
respectively, are sealed with this aluminum alternative. Synthetic stoppers, however, have been losing their share 
during recent years (-4.03% CAGR from 2011-2017). Increasing environmental concerns and the bio trend 
impacted synthetic closures, with clients opting for eco-friendlier options. Its only representative, Nomacorc, sold 
1.6B units in 2017, which is expected to decrease to 1.3B units in 2023 (-3.17% CAGR from 2017-2023). Besides 
screwcaps and synthetic stoppers, there is no evidence of a new substitute entering the market in the future. 
Market Risk | Exchange rate risk (MR10) 
Sales in non-euro currencies 2017YE accounted for 32.3% of total sales. The majority comes from the USA 
(18.5%) and the rest is scattered mainly in the rest of the Americas (7.2%) and Asia Pacific (5.9%). Raw material 
costs are mainly EUR denominated. In the last three years, only 3.5-6.5% of all cork purchases came from the non-
euro countries. Part of the exchange rate risk is born in the non-euro investments in subsidiaries. The exchange 
rate had an overall negative effect on sales of €1.8M 2017YE. COR uses forwards and options to hedge the 
exchange rate risk. Derivative contracts are mainly used to hedge the exposure to the USD/EUR risk (more than 
90% of the total hedged position).  
Other relevant risks are detailed in Appendix 30. 
Risks to Price Target  
Wine Consumption: The growth rate for the Cork Stoppers BU sales due to changes in wine consumption is also 
stressed in a sensitivity analysis (Table 2). In an unlikely scenario where the trend of wine consumption stabilizes, 
our recommendation would change to a Sell.  
Arroba Price: Considering the knowledge gathered in a survey that we conducted targeting the supply side, we 
forecast the price of cork in the range of prices recorded in 2016-2017. In our base case, we consider the price of 
raw materials to stabilize in 2021 at ~€33. Due to the price volatility, we tested some alternative scenarios to test 
COR’s sensibility to costs. As expected, when arroba’s price increases our TP will be reduced but with no 
significant impact, as the company can pass part of the costs to consumers through resetting prices (Table 11). 
Terminal Growth Rate: A change in the growth rate for the terminal period would affect our recommendation, 
as it is a key variable in any DCF model.  We considered a perpetual growth rate of 2.5%. If our conservative 
approach does not stand for the future, a decrease of 50 bps would result in a Hold recommendation, with an 
upside potential of 11%. Although we foresee such decreases as unlikely due to recent and historical growth 
patterns of this market leader company worldwide in the past 148 years (Table 12). 
Monte Carlo Simulation 
We performed a Monte Carlo simulation as a complementary analysis to our valuation. The average TP is 
€10.8/sh.  As proved by the analysis, our model is most sensitive to changes in the price of raw materials, the 
terminal growth rate, and the wine consumption CAGR. This method provides a certainty of 79% to our BUY 
recommendation (Table 13). 
Figure 30: Risk Matrix 
 
Source: Team estimates 
Figure 31: Average annual temperature 
in Portugal by season 
 
Source: The World Bank Group 
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2.1% € 10.1 
2.2% € 10.3 
2.3% € 10.5 
2.4% € 10.7 
2.5% € 10.9 
2.6% € 11.1 
2.7% € 11.3 
2.8% € 11.5 
2.9% € 11.7 
3.0% € 11.9 
Source: Team estimates 
 
Table 11: Sensitivity analysis for the 
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-40%    € 20.0 € 11.3 
-25%    € 25.0 € 11.2 
-10%    € 30.0  € 11.0 
    € 33.5  € 10.9 
4%   € 35.0  € 10.8 
19%    € 40.0  € 10.6 
34%    € 45.0  € 10.5 
49%    € 50.0   € 10.3 
Source: Team estimates 
 
Table 13: Monte Carlo Simulation 
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Dividend Policy under a Family-Owned Company  
As above mentioned, COR is owned and managed by the Amorim family. The family possesses ~75% of COR’s 
shares, being the sole decision-maker. From the six members of the Board of Directors (BoD), three carry the 
Amorim name, adding to the family’s long history of participating in the upper management of the company.  
At first glance, these factors may come through as a deal-breaker for many investors. Indeed, there are at least 
three concerning factors for minority shareholders – lack of independence in the management team, unclear 
remuneration policy, undefined payout policy. Afterall, COR scores a D in the Thompson Reuters Governance 
component of the ESG score – the second to lowest rating (Figure 32). The rank appears to reflect COR’s reality. 
However, we believe that the minority shareholder’s rights are in fact protected, and COR represents a valid 
investment option for those searching for a steady stream of income. 
Corporate Governance Issues  
The shareholder value maximization has been often linked to the concept of ‘good governance’ (Lazonick & 
O'Sullivan, 2000). As described by the United Nations, good governance is “participatory, consensus oriented, 
accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive, and follows the rule of law.” 
(United Nations ESCAP, 2009). Under good governance, the interests of minorities are considered and 
safeguarded.  
Research on corporate governance has been promoting, among others, an increase in board independence as a 
path towards this concept. (Nadler, 2004). Throughout the world, regulators and governments are increasingly 
aware of the importance of good governance, which lead to the creation of several codes on best/recommended  
Corporate Governance practices. In Portugal, this code is called “Código de Governo das Sociedades” (2018).  
Lack of Independence in the Executive Team  
COR follows a Reinforced Latin Corporate Governance model, which separates the management and supervisory 
duties. Without further details, this information could potentially reassure future investors. Yet, as the Amorim 
family is the controlling shareholder, it is responsible for appointing the members of these corporate committees. 
Thus, it is not surprising to find members of the family in the top management team. This type of Family Business 
Corporate Governance Model is best described as an Insider Board (Bromilow & Morrow, 2014), where the 
founder retains all the decision-making power. Under this type of ownership, boards are often assembled with 
the sole intention of protecting the family’s interests (Gomez-Mejia, et al., 2011).  In COR, neither the BoD or the 
Remuneration Committee are independent. The existent empirical evidence has shown that the lack of outside 
directors makes boards less accountable (Sonnenfeld, 2002), posing as a potential threat to minority 
shareholders.  
Nevertheless, the management team’s expertise in the cork business, passed down from previous generations, 
has been contributing to COR’s continuous growth, dismissing somehow these concerns. Over the years, COR has 
been reaffirming its position as an indisputable leader – increasing its market share from 32% to 43% in just 4 
years – despite several downturns in the cork industry (TCA issue, shortage of raw materials), much due to the 
continuous effort and knowledge of its leaders. Additionally, the Reinforced Latin CG model provides double 
supervision through the supervisory and statutory bodies, allowing greater transparency. The members of COR’s 
Supervisory Board fulfil the independence criteria set out by the Portuguese Companies’ Code1, Article 414 (5), 
which may tranquilize potential investors.  
Unclear Remuneration Policy of the BoD 
The Remuneration Committee is appointed with the task of establishing appropriate reward structures for 
directors (Conyon , 1997). According to G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, “it is regarded as a good 
practice for boards to develop and disclose a remuneration policy statement covering board members and key 
executives”. This policy must be quantifiable and bear in mind the long-run interests of the company (OECD, 
2015). For large companies, a good governance practice is often achieved when remuneration committees are 
majorly independent and free of conflict of interests.  (OECD, 2015) 
As aforementioned, COR’s executive directors are entitled to a fixed compensation plus a performance-based 
premium. Every year, the Remuneration Committee will assess the individual performance of the executive 
members of the BoD and define the variable component of their bonus. Note that this premium is only paid if the 
company’s results are not jeopardized. However, the criteria used to define such bonuses are highly subjective 
(contribution to the company’s growth and compliance of its strategic goals) and unquantifiable by outsiders. 
Moreover, COR’s Remuneration Committee lacks independence, going against the Portuguese Code of Corporate 
Governance recommendations. (CMVM, 2013) (IPCG, 2018) 
In 2017, total remuneration of the BoD amounted to €0.78M of which 29% (€0.23M) corresponded to a 
performance-based premium. Nonetheless, when analyzing COR’s overall performance, the relative weight of 
executives compensation has been decreasing over the years, amounting to less than ~0.3% of net income in 
2017YE(Figure 34),  
Undefined Payout Policy 
Literature suggests that dividends are synonym of a healthy, mature company, signaling to the market that the 
management team is confident regarding future earnings (Hicks, 2018). Additionally, cash dividends may be a 
great investment option for those searching for a constant and stable return, without having to reducing their 
ownership. However, this is only possible for companies with well-defined payout policy. Furthermore, for family-
controlled companies, literature suggests they are more prone to cut dividends when experiencing growth 
 
1 Código das Sociedades Comerciais by CMVM 
Figure 32: COR’s ESG score (overall 39)  
 
Source: Thompson Reuters 
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opportunities, since they do not feel obliged to pay out their earnings as a proof of their value to outsiders (Gugler, 
2003).  
Throughout the years, COR has secured its leading position in the market whilst increasing profits, even during 
bad years. This was partly possible through the continuous investment in R&D (€7.5M in 2017), which allowed 
COR to present a diversified and improved product to its customers. Plus, despite not having a defined dividend 
policy, the company has been rewarding shareholders regularly through dividends. DPS grew from €0.16 in 2012 
to €0.27 in 2018, corresponding to a payout ratio of almost 50% in the final year (Figure 27). This evidence 
suggests the company is not restraining from distributing excess cash or from taking part in growth opportunities, 
as often associated with these type of businesses.  
The Amorim Family’s Diverse Portfolio of Investments  
Besides COR, the Amorim family possesses a vast portfolio of investments. A little over a century after starting 
the cork business, the 3rd generation of the Amorim, namely Américo Amorim, decided to bet on other areas apart 
from cork. The cork industry was in good momentum, while TCA was still not an issue. Therefore, the timing to 
diversify was ideal. In 1981, the family founded the Portuguese bank SPI, now known as BPI (Banco Português de 
Investimento), which represented their first investment outside of cork. Now, almost 40 years later, the Amorim 
group is involved in 5 different sectors: cork, banking/financial activities, forestry, real estate, energy and luxury 
goods.  
From the numerous ventures, the Amorim family owns 33% of GALP, 25% of the luxury brand Tom Ford, and 
several investments in banks located all over the Iberian Peninsula, Brazil and Africa (Table 14). According to 
Forbes, the family’s net worth is estimated to be €4.8B, which makes them the wealthiest family in Portugal.  
The Implied Dividend Policy 
There is empirical evidence suggesting that family-owned companies typically underperform compared to their 
non-family peers (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006). Yet, COR has consistently proven otherwise. Often family firms tend 
to restrain from risky ventures, such as diversification or expansion, as a way of preserving the family wealth 
(Bertrand & Schoar, 2006), but not the Amorim. Contrarily, the family has taken hands into their wealth and 
created a vast portfolio of investment, which was partly made possible by COR.  When taking a closer look into 
the family’s portfolio of investments, it is noticeable that some of these were accumulated during periods of strong 
cash flow distribution from the cork business. Therefore, we believe that the family is using COR as a source of 
financing for their other business ventures. After all, as the controlling shareholder, the Amorim family is the 
primary beneficiary of the cash-dividends. 
Since they are entitled to ~75% of the distributed cash, it is on their best interest to maintain a steady flow of 
dividends to continue the diversification at a family level. This implicit dividend policy is unintentionally 
protecting minority interests, in a clear case where reality contrasts with the academic literature. Family-owned 
companies might be able to protect minority shareholders if their aim is to fuel the family’s wealth. The potential 
losses in socioemotional wealth prevent members from acting against each other (Gomez-Mejia, et al., 2011), 
which creates a shield for minority shareholders, since no member will try to jeopardize the family’s name. In 
addition, the members of the BoD carrying the Amorim name benefit indirectly from the dividends. Therefore, we 
believe it is highly unlikely for them to jeopardize this source of income.  
 
Table 14: Some of the Amorim Family 
Investments 
Portfolio of Investments 
COR 
GALP 
Casino Estoril 
Tom Ford 
Banco Único 
Banco Luso Brasileiro 
 
Source: Grupo Amorim  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Statement of Financial Position (COR) 
BALANCE  2015 2016 2017 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
CAGR  
19F-23F 
ASSETS 667,219 726,873 869,407 952,190 978,626 1,018,705 1,059,292 1,089,546 1,131,617 3.7% 
NON-CURRENT ASSETS 223,690 231,723 274,180 302,200 309,750 316,078 322,552 335,046 341,562 2.5% 
     Property, plant and equipment 190,352 197,454 227,905 246,948 252,908 259,125 265,532 272,009 278,560 2.4% 
     Investment property 5,008 7,100 5,678 5,959 5,830 5,677 5,497 5,293 5,063 -3.5% 
     Agriculture 0 0 0 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 5,500 0.0% 
     Goodwill 0 0 9,848 13,933 13,933 13,933 13,933 19,933 19,933 9.4% 
     Investment in associates 13,304 9,450 11,006 11,394 11,394 11,394 11,394 11,394 11,394 0.0% 
     Intangible Assets 2,489 3,776 4,077 4,532 4,814 5,080 5,325 5,546 5,742 4.5% 
     Other financial assets 4,177 3,940 2,520 1,960 3,396 3,396 3,396 3,396 3,396 0.0% 
     Deferred tax assets 8,359 10,004 13,146 11,974 11,974 11,974 11,974 11,974 11,974 0.0% 
CURRENT ASSETS 443,530 495,150 595,228 649,990 668,876 702,627 736,739 754,500 790,055 4.3% 
     Inventories 271,705 268,691 359,141 410,282 398,364 407,982 419,338 436,032 453,424 3.3% 
     Trade receivables 132,545 141,876 167,604 175,836 184,303 192,829 201,355 209,594 218,177 4.3% 
     Income tax assets 3,139 4,214 13,297 14,742 14,742 14,742 14,742 14,742 14,742 0.0% 
     Other current assets 28,678 29,249 38,180 37,563 37,563 37,563 37,563 37,563 37,563 0.0% 
     Cash and cash equivalents 7,461 51,119 17,005 11,567 33,904 49,511 63,741 56,569 66,149 18.2% 
EQUITY + LIABLITIES 667,219 726,873 869,407 952,190 978,626 1,018,705 1,059,292 1,089,546 1,131,617 3.7% 
EQUITY 354,133 426,943 459,991 502,876 529,211 561,367 592,648 629,633 658,143 5.6% 
     Share Capital 133,000 133,000 133,000 133,000 133,000 133,000 133,000 133,000 133,000 0.0% 
     Other Reserves 152,754 175,347 224,439 261,556 295,472 312,086 333,942 373,655 396,249 7.6% 
     Net Income 55,012 102,703 73,027 73,816 63,164 75,056 80,563 89,094 93,189 10.2% 
     Non-Controlling Interest 13,368 15,892 29,524 34,504 37,575 41,225 45,142 33,883 35,704 -1.3% 
LIABILITIES 313,086 299,930 409,417 449,314 449,415 457,338 466,644 459,913 473,474 1.3% 
Non-current liabilities 90,196 86,198 133,375 125,821 125,821 125,821 125,821 106,786 106,786 -4.0% 
     Interest-bearing loans 41,211 38,609 48,094 44,086 44,086 44,086 44,086 44,086 44,086 0.0% 
     Other borrowings and creditors 10,015 10,072 17,739 19,242 19,242 19,242 19,242 19,242 19,242 0.0% 
     Obligation to acquire N.C. interests 0 0 19,035 19,035 19,035 19,035 19,035 0 0 -100.0% 
     Provisions 32,227 30,661 41,320 36,838 36,838 36,838 36,838 36,838 36,838 0.0% 
     Deferred tax liabilities 6,743 6,856 7,187 6,620 6,620 6,620 6,620 6,620 6,620 0.0% 
Current liabilities 222,890 213,732 276,042 323,493 323,594 331,517 340,823 353,127 366,688 3.2% 
     Interest-bearing loans 50,146 48,399 61,695 89,781 85,292 81,027 76,976 73,127 69,471 -5.0% 
     Trade payables 121,184 109,985 157,096 171,268 171,431 180,713 191,164 204,510 218,802 6.3% 
     Other borrowings and creditors 49,518 49,631 55,019 58,382 62,809 65,715 68,620 71,428 74,353 4.3% 
     Income tax liabilities 2,042 5,717 2,231 4,062 4,062 4,062 4,062 4,062 4,062 0.0% 
 
BALANCE (Common Size) 2015 2016 2017 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
ASSETS 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
NON-CURRENT ASSETS 33.5% 31.9% 31.5% 31.7% 31.7% 31.0% 30.4% 30.8% 30.2% 
     Property, plant and equipment 28.5% 27.2% 26.2% 25.9% 25.8% 25.4% 25.1% 25.0% 24.6% 
     Investment property 0.8% 1.0% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 
     Agriculture 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 
     Goodwill 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 1.5% 1.4% 1.4% 1.3% 1.8% 1.8% 
     Investment in associates 2.0% 1.3% 1.3% 1.2% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 1.0% 1.0% 
     Intangible Assets 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 
     Other financial assets 0.6% 0.5% 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 
     Deferred tax assets 1.3% 1.4% 1.5% 1.3% 1.2% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 
CURRENT ASSETS 66.5% 68.1% 68.5% 68.3% 68.3% 69.0% 69.6% 69.2% 69.8% 
     Inventories 40.7% 37.0% 41.3% 43.1% 40.7% 40.0% 39.6% 40.0% 40.1% 
     Trade receivables 19.9% 19.5% 19.3% 18.5% 18.8% 18.9% 19.0% 19.2% 19.3% 
     Income tax assets 0.5% 0.6% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.3% 
     Other current assets 4.3% 4.0% 4.4% 3.9% 3.8% 3.7% 3.5% 3.4% 3.3% 
     Cash and cash equivalents 1.1% 7.0% 2.0% 1.2% 3.5% 4.9% 6.0% 5.2% 5.8% 
EQUITY + LIABLITIES 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
EQUITY 53.1% 58.7% 52.9% 52.8% 54.1% 55.1% 55.9% 57.8% 58.2% 
     Share Capital 19.9% 18.3% 15.3% 14.0% 13.6% 13.1% 12.6% 12.2% 11.8% 
     Other Reserves 22.9% 24.1% 25.8% 27.5% 30.2% 30.6% 31.5% 34.3% 35.0% 
     Net Income 8.2% 14.1% 8.4% 7.8% 6.5% 7.4% 7.6% 8.2% 8.2% 
     Non-Controlling Interest 2.0% 2.2% 3.4% 3.6% 3.8% 4.0% 4.3% 3.1% 3.2% 
LIABILITIES 46.9% 41.3% 47.1% 47.2% 45.9% 44.9% 44.1% 42.2% 41.8% 
Non-current liabilities 13.5% 11.9% 15.3% 13.2% 12.9% 12.4% 11.9% 9.8% 9.4% 
     Interest-bearing loans 6.2% 5.3% 5.5% 4.6% 4.5% 4.3% 4.2% 4.0% 3.9% 
     Other borrowings and creditors 1.5% 1.4% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 1.9% 1.8% 1.8% 1.7% 
     Obligation to acquire N.C. interests 0.0% 0.0% 2.2% 2.0% 1.9% 1.9% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
     Provisions 4.8% 4.2% 4.8% 3.9% 3.8% 3.6% 3.5% 3.4% 3.3% 
     Deferred tax liabilities 1.0% 0.9% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 
Current liabilities 33.4% 29.4% 31.8% 34.0% 33.1% 32.5% 32.2% 32.4% 32.4% 
     Interest-bearing loans 7.5% 6.7% 7.1% 9.4% 8.7% 8.0% 7.3% 6.7% 6.1% 
     Trade payables 18.2% 15.1% 18.1% 18.0% 17.5% 17.7% 18.0% 18.8% 19.3% 
     Other borrowings and creditors 7.4% 6.8% 6.3% 6.1% 6.4% 6.5% 6.5% 6.6% 6.6% 
     Income tax liabilities 0.3% 0.8% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 
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Appendix 2: Income Statement (COR) 
INCOME STATEMENT 2015 2016 2017 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
CAGR  
19F-23F 
Sales  604,800 641,411 701,609 764,329 801,135 838,199 875,260 911,073 948,381 4.31% 
COGS and changes in manufactured inv. 289,187 306,708 328,098 379,280 405,923 410,938 425,594 438,481 455,472 2.92% 
Gross Value 315,613 334,703 373,511 385,049 395,211 427,261 449,665 472,592 492,909 5.68% 
Third party supplies and services 100,537 103,001 116,524 120,996 126,505 132,358 138,210 143,865 149,756 4.31% 
Staff costs 111,881 113,291 125,630 137,182 143,451 150,088 156,724 163,137 169,817 4.31% 
Other costs and impairments 20,342 15,257 22,460 19,108 21,579 22,578 23,576 24,541 25,546 4.31% 
Current EBITDA 100,720 122,347 133,594 133,200 128,088 147,780 157,827 168,813 176,689 8.37% 
Depreciation 25,051 26,310 29,599 30,921 31,695 33,197 34,768 36,408 38,113 4.72% 
Current EBIT 75,669 96,037 103,995 102,279 96,394 114,583 123,059 132,405 138,577 9.50% 
Non-recurrent results -2,904 -4,353 -2,913 681 0 0 0 0 0 n.a. 
Financial Costs 2,139 1,646 1,471 2,564 2,270 2,265 2,322 2,403 2,491 2.34% 
Others* 3,858 -34 1,230 2,249 242 253 264 275 286   
Gain on the disposal of associates  0 47,577 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n.a. 
Profit before tax 73,066 142,592 100,842 102,645 94,365 112,570 121,001 130,277 136,372 9.64% 
Income tax 17,496 37,880 24,263 23,849 28,130 33,865 36,520 39,442 41,362 10.12% 
Profit after tax 55,570 104,713 76,579 78,796 66,235 78,706 84,481 90,835 95,010 9.44% 
Non-controlling interest 558 2,010 3,551 4,980 3,071 3,650 3,917 1,741 1,821 -12.25% 
Net income - equity holders of COR 55,012 102,703 73,027 73,816 63,164 75,056 80,563 89,094 93,189 10.21% 
EPS - Basic and Diluted (euros per share) 0.414 0.772 0.549 0.555 0.475 0.564 0.606 0.670 0.701 10.21% 
* Includes Provisions, Financial Income and Share of (loss)/profit of associates        
 
INCOME STATEMENT (Common Size) 2015 2016 2017 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
Sales  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
COGS and changes in manufactured inv. 47.8% 47.8% 46.8% 49.6% 50.7% 49.0% 48.6% 48.1% 48.0% 
Gross Value 52.2% 52.2% 53.2% 50.4% 49.3% 51.0% 51.4% 51.9% 52.0% 
Third party supplies and services 16.6% 16.1% 16.6% 15.8% 15.8% 15.8% 15.8% 15.8% 15.8% 
Staff costs 18.5% 17.7% 17.9% 17.9% 17.9% 17.9% 17.9% 17.9% 17.9% 
Other costs and impairments 3.4% 2.4% 3.2% 2.5% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 2.7% 
Current EBITDA 16.7% 19.1% 19.0% 17.4% 16.0% 17.6% 18.0% 18.5% 18.6% 
Depreciation 4.1% 4.1% 4.2% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 
Current EBIT 12.5% 15.0% 14.8% 13.4% 12.0% 13.7% 14.1% 14.5% 14.6% 
Non-recurrent results -0.5% -0.7% -0.4% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Financial Costs 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 
Others* 0.6% 0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Gain on the disposal of associates  0.0% 7.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Profit before tax 12.1% 22.2% 14.4% 13.4% 11.8% 13.4% 13.8% 14.3% 14.4% 
Income tax 2.9% 5.9% 3.5% 3.1% 3.5% 4.0% 4.2% 4.3% 4.4% 
Profit after tax 9.2% 16.3% 10.9% 10.3% 8.3% 9.4% 9.7% 10.0% 10.0% 
Non-controlling interest 0.1% 0.3% 0.5% 0.7% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 
Net income - equity holders of COR 9.1% 16.0% 10.4% 9.7% 7.9% 9.0% 9.2% 9.8% 9.8% 
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Appendix 3: Cash-Flow Statement (COR) 
CASH FLOW STATEMENT 2015 2016 2017 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
CAGR  
19F-23F 
OPERATING ACTIVITIES 89,867 69,285 38,284 62,295 107,999 107,958 114,782 120,590 126,570 4.0% 
EBIT 75,669 96,037 103,995 102,279 96,394 114,583 123,059 132,405 138,577 9.5% 
Taxes -17,496 -37,880 -24,263 -23,849 -28,130 -33,865 -36,520 -39,442 -41,362 10.1% 
Adjustments for non-cash charges              
Depreciation (PP&E) 25,051 26,310 29,599 29,593 30,137 31,550 33,029 34,573 36,181 4.7% 
Depreciation of investment property 0 0 0 419 828 854 879 905 930 2.9% 
Amortization of other intangibles 0 0 0 908 729 793 860 930 1,002 8.3% 
Deferred taxes 1,651 1,645 3,142 -1,172 0 0 0 0 0 n.a. 
Changes in operating assets and liabilities              
Accounts receivable -9,939 -9,331 -25,728 -8,232 -8,467 -8,527 -8,526 -8,239 -8,583 0.3% 
Inventory -24,072 3,014 -90,450 -51,141 11,918 -9,618 -11,356 -16,695 -17,392 n.a. 
Prepaid expenses & Other assets -3,911 -1,646 -18,014 -828 0 0 0 0 0 n.a. 
Accounts payable 5,881 -11,199 47,111 14,172 163 9,282 10,451 13,346 14,292 206.0% 
Other liabilities 37,033 2,335 12,892 145 4,427 2,906 2,906 2,808 2,925 -9.8% 
INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES -31,395 -33,576 -43,740 -55,519 -37,809 -39,525 -41,242 -61,936 -44,629 4.2% 
CAPEX PP&E -31,395 -33,576 -43,740 -48,637 -36,097 -37,767 -39,437 -41,050 -42,731 4.3% 
Investment in Intangible Assets 0 0 0 -1,363 -1,012 -1,059 -1,105 -1,151 -1,198 4.3% 
Investment in Investment Properties 0 0 0 -700 -700 -700 -700 -700 -700 0.0% 
Obligation to acquire Bourrassé 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -19,035 0   
Other investments 0 0 0 681 0 0 0 0 0   
Herdade da Baliza 0 0 0 -5,500 0 0 0 0 0   
FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES -58,296 -35,027 -3,992 -12,214 -47,853 -52,827 -59,309 -65,827 -72,361 10.9% 
Dividends paid -51,205 -31,920 -34,580 -35,910 -39,900 -46,550 -53,200 -59,850 -66,500 13.6% 
Debt issuances/repayments -2,237 -4,349 22,781 24,078 -4,489 -4,265 -4,051 -3,849 -3,656 -5.0% 
Financial Result -2,790 948 -1,280 -2,445 -2,028 -2,012 -2,058 -2,128 -2,204 2.1% 
Other financing items -2,064 294 9,087 2,063 -1,436 0 0 0 0 -100.0% 
Change in cash & cash equivalents 176 682 -9,448 -5,438 22,337 15,606 14,231 -7,173 9,580 -19.1% 
Beginning cash 6,036 7,461 51,119 17,005 11,567 33,904 49,511 63,741 56,569 48.7% 
Ending cash 6,212 8,143 41,671 11,567 33,904 49,511 63,741 56,569 66,149 18.2% 
 
CASH FLOW STATEMENT (Common-Size) 2015 2016 2017 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
OPERATING ACTIVITIES 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
EBIT 84.2% 138.6% 271.6% 164.2% 89.3% 106.1% 107.2% 109.8% 109.5% 
Taxes -19.5% -54.7% -63.4% -38.3% -26.0% -31.4% -31.8% -32.7% -32.7% 
Adjustments for non-cash charges 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Depreciation (PP&E) 27.9% 38.0% 77.3% 47.5% 27.9% 29.2% 28.8% 28.7% 28.6% 
Depreciation of investment property 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.7% 
Amortization of other intangibles 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 
Deffered taxes 1.8% 2.4% 8.2% -1.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Changes in operating assets and liabilities 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Accounts receivable -11.1% -13.5% -67.2% -13.2% -7.8% -7.9% -7.4% -6.8% -6.8% 
Inventory -26.8% 4.4% -236.3% -82.1% 11.0% -8.9% -9.9% -13.8% -13.7% 
Prepaid expenses & Other assets -4.4% -2.4% -47.1% -1.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Accounts payable 6.5% -16.2% 123.1% 22.7% 0.2% 8.6% 9.1% 11.1% 11.3% 
Other liabilities 41.2% 3.4% 33.7% 0.2% 4.1% 2.7% 2.5% 2.3% 2.3% 
INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES -34.9% -48.5% -114.3% -89.1% -35.0% -36.6% -35.9% -51.4% -35.3% 
CAPEX PP&E -34.9% -48.5% -114.3% -78.1% -33.4% -35.0% -34.4% -34.0% -33.8% 
Investment in Intangible Assets 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -2.2% -0.9% -1.0% -1.0% -1.0% -0.9% 
Investment in Investment Properties 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -1.1% -0.6% -0.6% -0.6% -0.6% -0.6% 
Obligation to acquire Bourrassé 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -15.8% 0.0% 
Other investments 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Herdade da Baliza 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -8.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES -64.9% -50.6% -10.4% -19.6% -44.3% -48.9% -51.7% -54.6% -57.2% 
Dividends paid -57.0% -46.1% -90.3% -57.6% -36.9% -43.1% -46.3% -49.6% -52.5% 
Debt issuances/repayments -2.5% -6.3% 59.5% 38.7% -4.2% -4.0% -3.5% -3.2% -2.9% 
Financial Result -3.1% 1.4% -3.3% -3.9% -1.9% -1.9% -1.8% -1.8% -1.7% 
Other financing items -2.3% 0.4% 23.7% 3.3% -1.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Change in cash & cash equivalents 0.2% 1.0% -24.7% -8.7% 20.7% 14.5% 12.4% -5.9% 7.6% 
Beginning cash 6.7% 10.8% 133.5% 27.3% 10.7% 31.4% 43.1% 52.9% 44.7% 
Ending cash 6.9% 11.8% 108.8% 18.6% 31.4% 45.9% 55.5% 46.9% 52.3% 
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Appendix 4: Key Financial Ratios 
KEY FINANCIAL RATIOS Units 2015 2016 2017 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
Liquidity Ratios                     
Current Ratio times 1.99 2.32 2.16 2.01 2.07 2.12 2.16 2.14 2.15 
Quick Ratio  times 0.77 1.06 0.86 0.74 0.84 0.89 0.93 0.90 0.92 
Cash Ratio  times 0.03 0.24 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.15 0.19 0.16 0.18 
Efficiency Ratios                     
Total Assets Turnover  times 0.94 0.92 0.88 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.85 
Receivables Turnover  times 4.74 4.67 4.53 4.45 4.45 4.45 4.44 4.43 4.43 
Collection Period (DSO) days 77 78 81 82 82 82 82 82 82 
Inventory Turnover times 1.18 1.09 1.06 1.04 1.00 1.02 1.03 1.03 1.02 
Days in Inventory (DIO) days 308 335 344 350 364 358 355 356 356 
Payables Turnover  times 2.60 2.55 2.49 2.44 2.37 2.33 2.29 2.22 2.15 
Payables Period (DPO) days 140 143 146 149 154 156 159 165 170 
Operating Cycle  days 385 413 425 432 446 440 437 438 439 
Cash Cycle  days 245 270 278 283 292 284 277 274 269 
CAPEX/Dep times 1.25 1.28 1.48 1.57 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.16 1.15 
CAPEX/Sales % 5.2% 5.2% 6.2% 6.5% 4.6% 4.6% 4.6% 4.6% 4.6% 
PP&E/sales % 31.5% 30.8% 32.5% 32.3% 31.6% 30.9% 30.3% 29.9% 29.4% 
Operating Costs/Sales % 38.5% 36.1% 37.7% 36.3% 36.4% 36.4% 36.4% 36.4% 36.4% 
NWC/Sales % 43.5% 43.5% 52.6% 53.6% 50.2% 48.7% 47.4% 46.5% 45.6% 
Profitability Ratios                     
Gross Profit Margin  % 52.2% 52.2% 53.2% 50.4% 49.3% 51.0% 51.4% 51.9% 52.0% 
EBITDA Margin % 16.7% 19.1% 19.0% 17.4% 16.0% 17.6% 18.0% 18.5% 18.6% 
EBIT Margin % 12.5% 15.0% 14.8% 13.4% 12.0% 13.7% 14.1% 14.5% 14.6% 
Net Profit Margin  % 9.1% 16.0% 10.4% 9.7% 7.9% 9.0% 9.2% 9.8% 9.8% 
ROA  % 8.6% 14.7% 9.1% 8.1% 6.5% 7.5% 7.8% 8.3% 8.4% 
ROCE  % 17.0% 18.7% 17.5% 16.3% 14.7% 16.7% 17.1% 18.0% 18.1% 
ROC  % 12.9% 13.7% 13.9% 12.3% 10.3% 11.7% 12.0% 12.4% 12.5% 
ROE  % 16.4% 26.3% 16.5% 15.3% 12.2% 13.8% 14.0% 14.6% 14.5% 
EPS  €/unit 0.41 0.77 0.55 0.56 0.47 0.56 0.61 0.67 0.70 
SG&A/Sale  % 18.5% 17.7% 17.9% 17.9% 17.9% 17.9% 17.9% 17.9% 17.9% 
Solvency Ratios                     
Long- and short-term Debt Ratio % 13.7% 12.0% 12.6% 14.1% 13.2% 12.3% 11.4% 10.8% 10.0% 
Long-term Debt Ratio  % 6.2% 5.3% 5.5% 4.6% 4.5% 4.3% 4.2% 4.0% 3.9% 
Debt to Equity Ratio  times 0.26 0.20 0.24 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.17 
Equity Multiplier  times 1.88 1.70 1.89 1.89 1.85 1.81 1.79 1.73 1.72 
Debt to EBITDA times 0.91 0.71 0.82 1.01 1.01 0.85 0.77 0.69 0.64 
Net Debt to EBITDA times 0.83 0.29 0.69 0.92 0.75 0.51 0.36 0.36 0.27 
Interest Coverage Ratio  times 35.38 58.35 70.70 39.89 42.46 50.58 52.99 55.10 55.64 
Equity to Assets % 53.1% 58.7% 52.9% 52.8% 54.1% 55.1% 55.9% 57.8% 58.2% 
Source: Company data & Team estimates 
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Appendix 5: Income Statement Assumptions 
INCOME 
STATEMENT 
Notes 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F TV Assumptions 
SALES                 
Raw Materials 
BU 
Raw Materials as 
% of Cork 
Stoppers Sales 
34.93% 34.18% 33.43% 32.68% 31.93%  
Raw Material Sales were estimated as % of Cork Stoppers Sales. In 2019, it was 
assumed a % equal to the average Raw Materials Sales to Cork Stopper Sales 
(2012-17).  Thereafter, the mentioned percentage decreases 75 bp YoY, reflecting 
the expected increase in the average selling price of cork stoppers (+100 bps 
YoY). 
Cork Stoppers 
BU 
Total expected 
growth YoY 
6.05% 6.05% 5.54% 
 
5.04% 
 
5.04%  
Cork Stopper Sales in t = Volume of Cork Stoppers sold in t * Average Selling Price 
in t. The Volume of Cork Stoppers sold is expected to grow at 4-5% YoY, bolstered 
by increasing preference for this type of closure. The Average Selling Price per 
Cork Stopper is estimated to increase +100 bps YoY as consumer preferences are 
shifting towards more expensive wines which require pricier Cork Stoppers. 
Volume sold (in 
billions) 
5.95 6.25 6.53 6.79 7.07  
Average Selling 
Price per cork 
stopper (in €) 
0.095 0.096 0.097 0.098 0.099  
Floor & Wall 
Coverings BU 
Overall YoY -0.40% 1.60% 3.10% 3.60% 3.60%  
The Floor & Wall Coverings BU is expected to grow at the Global Construction 
Industry CAGR 2018-22. Nonetheless, as the BU has been experiencing some 
operational issues related to cost management and low revenue production, it 
was assumed that in the period 2019-21, sales would grow at a YoY rate lower 
than the abovementioned CAGR, gradually recovering over time.  
Global 
Construction 
Industry CAGR 
3.60% 3.60% 3.60% 3.60% 3.60%  
Discount for BU 
problems 
4.00% 2.00% 0.50% 0.00% 0.00%  
Composite Cork 
BU 
 1.89% 1.89% 1.89% 1.89% 1.89%  Historical Composite Cork BU CAGR 2012-17. 
Insulation Cork 
BU 
Global 
Construction 
Industry CAGR 
3.60% 3.60% 3.60% 3.60% 3.60%  
Insulation Cork BU is engaged in the production of insulation agglomerates 
destined to the Construction Industry at a worldwide level. It will grow at the 
Global Construction Industry CAGR 2018-22. 
Holding 
Sales of the 
Holding as % of 
Total Sales of the 
BUs 
0.46%  Average Holding as % of the 5 BUs' Sales (2012-17). 
Adjustment 
Adjustment as % 
of Total Sales of 
the BUs 
20%  
An adjustment is carried out to eliminate sales within BUs as well as amounts that 
are not allocated to a given BU.  Computed as % of Total Sales of the BUs, 
assuming a constant value of 20% based on the Average Adjustment to Total 
Sales of the 5 BUs (2012-17). 
COGS                 
COGS 
COGS as % of 
Total Sales 
49.03% 49.03% 49.03% 48.53% 48.03%  
COGS in t are related to the cork purchased in t-1, reflecting, therefore, the price 
per arroba of the previous year.  It was computed as % of Total Sales and 
considering the effect of changes in arroba price on COGS. From 2019F to 2021F 
we used the historical average COGS/Sales between 2012-17. From 2022F 
onwards, we applied a discount factor of 0.5% to the historical average since the 
Average Selling Price of Cork Stoppers is increasing over time and the arroba 
price is expected to stabilize.   
@ Price 34.20 33.50 33.00 33.00 33.00  
Change in @ 
price 
-10.00% -2.05% -1.49% 0.00% 0.00%  
Δ Manufactured 
Inventories 
 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  
As mentioned during the conference call on Dec 18, 2018, the company produces 
by order. Therefore, we assumed changes in manufactured inventories to be zero.  
OPEX                 
Third party 
supplies and 
services 
TPSS as % of 
Total Sales 
15.79% 15.79% 15.79% 15.79% 15.79%  Computed as % of Sales assuming a constant % equal to the one in 2018F. 
Staff costs 
Staff Costs as % 
of Total Sales 
17.91% 17.91% 17.91% 17.91% 17.91%  Computed as % of Sales assuming a constant % equal to the one in 2018F. 
Impairment of 
assets 
 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  We considered that impairments will be 0 as of 2019. Hard to predict. 
Other gains 
Other gains as % 
of Total Sales 
1.52% 1.52% 1.52% 1.52% 1.52%  Average of Other Gains as % of Total Sales (2012-17). 
Other costs 
Other costs as % 
of Total Sales 
1.17% 1.17% 1.17% 1.17% 1.17%  Average of Other Costs as % of Total Sales (2012-17). 
D&A                 
PP&E 
Depreciation 
Rate 
 3.92%  Average of Depreciation Rate (2012-17). 
Investment 
Property 
Depreciation 
Rate 
 6.30%  Average of Depreciation Rate (2012-17). 
Intangible Assets 
Amortization 
Rate 
 3.63%  Average of Amortization Rate (2012-17). 
Financial Result                 
Interest Costs 
and other 
financial costs 
Cost of debt 1.70% 1.75% 1.86% 1.99% 2.13% 3.31% 
Interest Costs and Other Financial Costs = Total Interest-Bearing Loans in t-1 * 
Cost of debt in t. 
Provisions  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  
As in 3Q2018 provisions were 0, the team assumed that no further provisions will 
be recognized in the coming years. Hard to predict. 
Financial Income  0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03%  Median of Financial Income as % of Sales (2012-17). 
Other                 
Non-recurrent 
Results 
 0 0 0 0 0  In the forecasted years, nonrecurrent results are assumed to be 0. Hard to predict. 
Share of 
loss/profit in 
associates 
 0 0 0 0 0  
Depends on the profitability of subsidiary companies, therefore the team 
assumed a value of 0 in the coming years. Hard to predict. 
Gain on the 
disposal of 
associates 
 0 0 0 0 0  
The amount recorded in 2015 is related to the disposal of US Floors. No further 
disposals of associates are expected to occur in the coming years, therefore the 
team assumed that this item will be 0 throughout the forecasted period.  
Non-controlling 
interest (NCI) 
 4.64% 4.64% 4.64% 1.92% 1.92%  
In the first 3 forecasted years, NCI was computed as Profit after Tax * % NCI on 
Profit after Tax in 2017. As of 2022, the percentage allocated to NCI decreases to 
the average of NCI as % of Profit after Tax (2012-16) as a consequence of the 
acquisition of the additional ownership stake of Bourrassé.    
Taxes                 
Tax Rate 
Effective 29.81% 30.08% 30.18% 30.28% 30.33% 30.33% 
Effective Tax Rate considering the Portuguese Legal Tax Rate, State Surcharge 
Rate and Municipal Tax Rate. Source: PWC Tax Guide 2018. The tax rate in the 
terminal period is equal to the one in 2023F.  Appendix 2. 
Legal Tax Rate 21.00% 21.00% 21.00% 21.00% 21.00% 21.00% 
Municipal 
Surcharge Rate 
1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 
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Appendix 6: Statement of Financial Position Assumptions 
BALANCE 
SHEET 
Notes 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F   Assumptions 
Non-current 
Assets 
              
  
Total CAPEX   4.63% 4.63% 4.63% 4.63% 4.63%   
Total CAPEX is estimated as % of Sales, assuming a constant rate of 4.63% based on the 4Y 
(2012-16) historical average CAPEX/Sales ratio. Appendix 11. 
Property, plant 
and equipment 
% of Total CAPEX 97.27% 97.27% 97.27% 97.27% 97.27%   
PP&E in t = PP&E in t-1 + Investment in PP&E - Depreciation in t. Investment in PP&E in t 
represents 97.27% of Total CAPEX. Appendix 11. 
Investment 
property 
YoY Investment 700 700 700 700 700   
Inv. Properties in t = Inv. Properties in t-1 + Investment in Inv. Properties in t - Depreciation 
in t. Investment in Inv. Properties are estimated to be € 700 YoY. Appendix 11. 
Agriculture   5,500   
In 4Q2018, COR acquired Herdade da Baliza for € 5.5M, representing the company's first 
investment in a forest property. According to information provided by the company, such 
property will function as a showcase rather than being used for production. Herdade da 
Baliza was recorded at its acquisition cost and no goodwill was considered. In the forecasted 
period 2019-23, the value is assumed to remain equal to the one in 2018.  
Goodwill   0 0 0 6,000 0   
Equal to the nominal value of 2018 in the first 3 years. In 2022, the company will acquire the 
remaining 40% of Bourrassé and recognize € 6M in goodwill. Goodwill in 2023 is the same as 
in 2022. No further acquisitions are expected. Appendix 10. 
Investment in 
associates 
  0 0 0 0 0   
Related to entities in which COR has a stake and through which the group operates, acting as 
distribution channels. Investment in associates in t = Investment in Associates in t-1 + Share 
of (loss)/profit of associates in t + Gain on the disposal of associates in t. 
Intangible 
Assets 
% of Total CAPEX 2.73% 2.73% 2.73% 2.73% 2.73%   
Intangible Assets = Intangible Assets in t-1 + Investment in Intangibles in t - Amortization in 
t. Investment in Intangibles in t represents 2.73% of Total CAPEX. Appendix 11. 
Other financial 
assets 
  3,396 3,396 3,396 3,396 3,396   
Consists mostly of available-for-sale equity instruments. In the forecasted period, it was 
assumed a value equal to the 5Y (2012-17) historical average, which is expected to remain 
constant throughout the years.  
Deferred tax 
assets 
  0 0 0 0 0   Equal to the 2018F nominal value. 
Current Assets                 
Inventories 
Expected quantity 
of arroba 
purchased 
  11,317    11,840    12,364    12,870    13,397    
Appendix 9. 
Δ Manufactured 
Inventories 
0 0 0 0 0   
Historical Avg 
Goods & Advances 
(2012-17) 
  11,329    11,329    11,329    11,329    11,329    
Trade 
receivables 
  1.05 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.04   
It will grow according to Sales growth YoY. Trade Receivables in t = Trade Receivables in t-1 
* (1+ Δ% Sales in t). 
Income tax 
assets 
  0 0 0 0 0   Equal to the 2018F nominal value. 
Other current 
assets 
  0 0 0 0 0   Equal to the 2018F nominal value. 
                  
Equity                 
 Share Capital   0 0 0 0 0   No share issue is expected. Equal to the 2018FY nominal value. 
 Other Reserves   0 0 0 19,000 0   
Other Reserves in t = Other Reserves in t-1 + Net income in t-1 - Dividends paid in t. In 
2022F, € 19M are added back as a result of the acquisition of the remaining ownership stake.  
Appendix 10. 
Non-
Controlling 
Interest 
  0 0 0 -13,000 0   Appendix 10. 
                  
Non-current 
liabilities 
              
  
Interest-
bearing loans 
  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%   Debt is assumed to be constant from 2018F onwards. 
Other 
borrowings and 
creditors 
  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%   Equal to the 2018F nominal value. 
Obligation to 
acquire N.C. 
interests 
  0.00 0.00 0.00 -19,035 0.00   Appendix 10. 
Provisions   0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%   Equal to the 2018F nominal value. 
Deferred tax 
liabilities 
  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%   Equal to the 2018F nominal value. 
                  
Current 
liabilities 
              
  
Interest-
bearing loans 
  -5.00% -5.00% -5.00% -5.00% -5.00%  Strong operating cash flow enables a debt repayment of 5% YoY. 
Trade payables   1.00 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.07   
Trade Payables in t = Trade Payables in t-1 * (1+ Δ% Inventories in t + 3%). The extra factor 
added corresponds to the power over suppliers of cork.  
Other 
borrowings and 
creditors 
  7.84% 7.84% 7.84% 7.84% 7.84%   
Composed mostly of VAT and accrued costs related to staff and services. Historical Average 
of Other Borrowings and Creditors to Sales (2012-17). 
Income tax 
liabilities 
  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%   Equal to the 2018F nominal value. 
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Appendix 7: Sales breakdown by BU  
The Raw Materials BU sales are predominantly within the Group, with the Cork Stoppers BU representing the largest buyer. Having this in mind, Raw 
Material Sales were estimated as a % of Cork Stoppers Sales. In 2019, it was assumed to be a % equal to the average Raw Materials Sales to Cork Stopper Sales 
(2012-17).  Thereafter, the mentioned percentage decreases 75 bp YoY, reflecting the expected increase in the average selling price of cork stoppers (+100 
bps YoY) due to changing consumer preferences toward premium wines. 
The Cork Stoppers BU is directly related to the wine consumption. We assumed that the wine closures industry will grow at the same pace as wine 
consumption (3.23% CAGR 2018-2023). Wineries forecast the amount of bottled wine based on the consumption, as it is stable and historically below total 
production. Increasing consumer preferences toward cork and the shift in wine preferences to premium wines allow the cork stoppers industry to grow 
above the closures market at +4% CAGR from 2018F-23F. COR’s competitive positioning, combined with the investment in CAPEX, will enable the company 
to keep growing organically and reinforce its position as the market leader. In the forecasted period, Cork Stoppers Sales were estimated as: 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑑 ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒. 
Regarding the first, it was assumed that it will grow at an above average rate of 4-5% YoY, reflecting the acquisition of Bourrassé as well as increasing demand 
for this closure. The average selling price, on the other hand, is projected to increase 100 bps YoY as consumer preferences are shifting towards more 
expensive wines which require pricier Cork Stoppers.   
 
The Floor & Wall Coverings BU supplies products to the construction industry, therefore it is expected to grow at +3.6% CAGR from 2018-22 of the 
Construction Industry. Nonetheless, as this BU has been experiencing some operational issues related to cost management and low revenue production (Sales 
decreased -7.7% in 9M2018 compared to the homologous period), we assumed that in the period 2019-21 sales would grow at a YoY rate lower than the 
abovementioned CAGR, gradually recovering over time. The newly changed management coupled with a continuous investment in R&D to launch cutting 
edge products is expected to prompt the recovery of the BU. 
The Composite BU is present in 25 different sectors, from construction to footwear. In the kickoff meeting (16th November 2018) was mentioned that this 
BU was created for brand-awareness. In this sense, we assumed a conservative approach for the forecasted period by using the historical CAGR 2012-17 of 
this BU.  
The Insulation BU will grow at the same pace as the construction industry (+3.6% CAGR 2018F-23F).  
 
Sales Breakdown 2015 2016 2017 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
Raw Materials 135,437 148,634 156,074 177,744 198,425 205,911 212,559 218,263 224,001 
YoY 3.1% 9.7% 5.0% 13.9% 11.6% 3.8% 3.2% 2.7% 2.6% 
% Total Sales 22.4% 23.2% 22.2% 23.3% 24.8% 24.6% 24.3% 24.0% 23.6% 
Cork Stoppers 392,825 422,766 477,058 535,733 568,145 602,518 635,927 667,978 701,644 
YoY 9.9% 7.6% 12.8% 12.3% 6.1% 6.1% 5.5% 5.0% 5.0% 
% Total Sales 65.0% 65.9% 68.0% 70.1% 70.9% 71.9% 72.7% 73.3% 74.0% 
F&W Coverings 109,843 117,128 121,536 112,964 112,512 114,312 117,856 122,099 126,495 
YoY -5.6% 6.6% 3.8% -7.1% -0.4% 1.6% 3.1% 3.6% 3.6% 
% Total Sales 18.2% 18.3% 17.3% 14.8% 14.0% 13.6% 13.5% 13.4% 13.3% 
Composites 99,980 100,085 98,777 102,776 104,719 106,698 108,715 110,770 112,863 
YoY 18.6% 0.1% -1.3% 4.0% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 
% Total Sales 16.5% 15.6% 14.1% 13.4% 13.1% 12.7% 12.4% 12.2% 11.9% 
Insulation 10,040 11,440 10,589 11,557 11,973 12,404 12,851 13,313 13,793 
YoY 0.3% 13.9% -7.4% 9.1% 3.6% 3.6% 3.6% 3.6% 3.6% 
% Total Sales 1.7% 1.8% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 
Holding&Adjustment -143,325 -158,641 -162,425 -176,445 -194,640 -203,645 -212,649 -221,350 -230,414 
YoY 3.1% 10.7% 2.4% 8.6% 10.3% 4.6% 4.4% 4.1% 4.1% 
% Total Sales -23.7% -24.7% -23.2% -23.1% -24.3% -24.3% -24.3% -24.3% -24.3% 
 
 
Appendix 8: EBITDA margin per BU 
Sales Breakdown 2015 2016 2017 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
Raw Materials 16,988 18,328 22,375 30,577 22,916 26,224 27,687 29,213 30,145 
EBITDAm 12.5% 12.3% 14.3% 17.2% 11.5% 12.7% 13.0% 13.4% 13.5% 
Contribution 16.9% 15.0% 16.7% 23.0% 17.9% 17.7% 17.5% 17.3% 17.1% 
Cork Stoppers 62,753 75,604 91,350 95,390 88,879 103,938 112,199 121,101 127,903 
EBITDAm 16.0% 17.9% 19.1% 17.8% 15.6% 17.3% 17.6% 18.1% 18.2% 
Contribution 62.3% 61.8% 68.4% 71.6% 69.4% 70.3% 71.1% 71.7% 72.4% 
F&W Coverings 8,173 12,732 8,284 3,320 7,570 8,481 8,943 13,554 14,119 
EBITDAm 7.4% 10.9% 6.8% 2.9% 6.7% 7.4% 7.6% 11.1% 11.2% 
Contribution 8.1% 10.4% 6.2% 2.5% 5.9% 5.7% 5.7% 8.0% 8.0% 
Composites 14,585 16,989 15,010 10,315 14,031 15,765 16,428 15,270 15,644 
EBITDAm 14.6% 17.0% 15.2% 10.0% 13.4% 14.8% 15.1% 13.8% 13.9% 
Contribution 14.5% 13.9% 11.2% 7.7% 11.0% 10.7% 10.4% 9.0% 8.9% 
Insulation 1,241 2,157 1,680 1,047 995 1,137 1,205 1,282 1,336 
EBITDAm 12.4% 18.9% 15.9% 9.1% 8.3% 9.2% 9.4% 9.6% 9.7% 
Contribution 1.2% 1.8% 1.3% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 
Holding&Adjustment -3,022 -3,465 -5,107 -7,450 -6,304 -7,766 -8,636 -11,610 -12,459 
Contribution -3.0% -2.8% -3.8% -5.6% -4.9% -5.3% -5.5% -6.9% -7.1% 
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Appendix 9: Inventories 
Inventories are composed of Raw Materials, Finished and Semi-Finished Goods, Work in Progress, By-Products, Goods and Advances. Historically, non-cork 
products (Goods and Advances) averaged €11.3M. To estimate the inventories related to cork products, we used purchases as a proxy. As mentioned during 
the conference call, the company produces by order. Therefore, we assumed changes in manufactured inventories to be zero. In this sense, we forecasted the 
amount of arroba needed based on the previous year amount which will grow at the same pace as sales. 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 + 𝐴𝑣𝑔. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠&𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 + ∆𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑡 = 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑡−1 ∗ (1 +
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
) 
 
Appendix 10: Consolidation of Bourrassé’s acquisition in COR’s Financial Statements 
On July 2017, COR announced the acquisition of Bourrassé, a French company engaged in the production of cork stoppers.  Under the terms of the agreement, 
COR first acquired 60% of Bourrassé’s capital in 2017, while the additional 40% ownership is expected to be acquired by 2022.  
As there is no publicly available information on the exact date in which the remaining stake will be acquired, it was assumed that the acquisition would take 
place in 2022. It is our belief that COR will opt to finalize the deal in 2022 as in this way it will make use of Bourrassé’s profits from the years in-between to 
acquire the additional share of ownership.  Upon the acquisition of the 60% of capital, the acquiree’s net assets and liabilities were consolidated within the 
Group. Additionally, it was recorded: (1) a Financial Liability of € 19M as a result of the agreement to acquire the remaining 40%, (2) Non-Controlling Interests 
in the amount of €13M and (3) a counterbalancing €19M decrease in “Other Reserves”. In 2022, the abovementioned items are reversed as COR now holds 
100% of Bourrassé. 
Appendix 11: COR's CAPEX 
Total CAPEX, as defined by the company, encompasses Investment in PP&E and Intangibles. As disclosed in the kick-off meeting, the company invested €50M 
in 2018YE in Total CAPEX, of which €35M were employed to increase the production capacity of the Cork Stoppers BU, at that time operating at full capacity. 
From 2019 onwards, Total CAPEX is estimated as % of Sales, assuming a constant rate of 4.63% based on the historical average (2012-16) Total 
CAPEX-to-Sales ratio. In further detail, the team considered that, in order to boost and sustain growth during the forecasted years, the company will need to 
invest in PP&E and Intangibles, mostly to maintain and replace currently owned assets. Thus, CAPEX should grow with Sales.  
PP&E Investment is estimated at 97.27% of Total CAPEX, considering the 2012-16 average weight of PP&E Investment on Total CAPEX. Investment in 
Intangibles corresponds to the difference between Total CAPEX and Investment in PP&E, yielding values that are in line with the average expenditure on this 
type of asset from 2015-17.   
Additionally, we assume that in each year the company invests a fixed amount of 0.7M€ in Investment Properties to maintain the average increase in this 
asset verified in previous years. 
Investment in PP&E, Intangibles and Inv. Properties 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
Total Investment 50,700 37,809 39,525 41,242 42,901 44,629 
Total CAPEX 50,000 37,109 38,825 40,542 42,201 43,929 
      CAPEX PP&E 48,637 36,097 37,767 39,437 41,050 42,731 
      Investment in Intangibles 1,363 1,012 1,059 1,105 1,151 1,198 
Investment in Investment Properties 700 700 700 700 700 700 
 
Depreciation Rate % 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
Total Depreciation 30,921 31,694 33,197 34,768 36,407 38,112 
PP&E 29,593 30,136 31,550 33,029 34,573 36,180 
Investment Property 419 828 853 879 904 929 
Intangible Assets 908 729 793 859 929 1,002 
Appendix 12: Cost of Debt 
COR has a long-lasting relationship with banks which allows them to use bank overdrafts whenever needed. Additionally, the company obtains special loan 
agreements. An example is a loan obtained with the European Investment Bank (EIB) in 2015, that was negotiated at a lower cost which reduced the average 
rate of interest-bearing debt. The strong operating cash flow allows COR to pay their debt, but it may not be optimal. For the forecasted period we assumed a 
floating cost of debt linked with the 6M Euribor rate. For the terminal period, the 30-year 6M Euribor rate is considered.  
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡−1 + ∆ Forecast 6M Euribor Rate𝑡 
Cost of debt 2017 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F TV 
6M Euribor -0.27% -0.25% -0.25% -0.19% -0.09% 0.04% 0.18% 1.37% 
Changes in Euribor  0.02% 0.00% 0.06% 0.11% 0.13% 0.14% 1.18% 
Cost of debt 1.67% 1.69% 1.70% 1.75% 1.86% 1.99% 2.13% 3.31% 
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Appendix 13: WACC Assumptions 
WACC 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F TV 
Re 6.24% 6.52% 6.52% 6.52% 6.52% 8.29% 
Rf 0.89% 1.17% 1.17% 1.17% 1.17% 2.94% 
MRP  7.44% 7.44% 7.44% 7.44% 7.44% 7.44% 
Levered Beta (β)  0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 
After tax Rd 1.19% 1.22% 1.30% 1.38% 1.48% 2.30% 
Cost of debt 1.70% 1.75% 1.86% 1.99% 2.13% 3.31% 
Tax Rate 29.81% 30.08% 30.18% 30.28% 30.33% 30.33% 
WACC 5.70% 5.95% 6.00% 6.05% 6.09% 7.69% 
E/V 89.24% 89.27% 90.04% 90.80% 91.38% 90.00% 
D/V 10.76% 10.73% 9.96% 9.20% 8.62% 10.00% 
 
Cost of Equity: Is applied the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Since we considered the MRP for Portugal, the CRP was not deemed necessary because 
our approach already reflects country idiosyncratic risks. Despite the fact that the company is sensitive to Portuguese risks (most costs are incurred in 
Portugal), in the demand side, the company sells worldwide. Moreover, the company finances itself in Portugal, but has been able to finance at very low rates 
– which are only suitable for a company operating in a AAA country. We view COR as having a better rating than Portugal, therefore it seems deemed 
appropriate to use German Bond Yield. 
𝑅𝑒 = 𝑅𝐹𝑅 +  𝛽 ∗ 𝑀𝑅𝑃 
Risk-Free Rate: We considered the 10-year German Government Bond forecast as our risk-free rate for 2019-23 and for the terminal period the 20-year 
average of the 10-year German Government Bond. 
Unlevered Beta: 
Approach A: We used the Pure-Play Method based on peers to reach the levered beta, but OENEO is the solely appropriate peer. First: we computed the 
unlevered beta considering OENEO’s figures for 2017. Second: We used the unlevered beta obtained on the first step to reach COR’s levered beta, considering 
the company’s level of debt, equity and tax rate.  This approach is not the most accurate to value COR as we only consider one peer. 
Approach B: Using the same approach as in A but considering the unlevered beta for the industry retrieved from Thomson Reuters. COR’s fits into the Forest 
and Wood Products industry which includes companies that are not completely comparable with COR, so, again the results would not be correct. 
Approach C: We performed four regressions considering 4 indices – PSI20, STOXX50, EuroNext100 and EuroNext150 – and COR’s monthly returns to obtain 
the beta (“raw”). By performing the Blume Adjustment, we obtained the adjusted beta for each index. This adjustment will allow us to obtain a more precise 
forecast of the beta. The index that best fits COR returns is PSI20, because of the higher adjusted r-squared.  
 
 Approach A: Pure Play 
Method using Peers 
Approach B: Pure Play Method using the 
Unlevered Beta of the industry 
Approach C: Regressions 
 PSI20 STOXX50 EuroNext100 EuroNext150 
Beta  0.48 1.14 0.72 0.69 0.80 0.83 
 
MRP: The inputs used to reach the MRP for the company were the monthly returns for PSI20 and the monthly 10-year German Government Bond for the 
period between 2008-2018. 
𝐸𝑅𝑃 =  
∑(𝑅𝑃𝑆𝐼20 − 𝑅𝐹𝑅)
𝜎𝑃𝑆𝐼20 𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙
∗ 𝜎𝑃𝑆𝐼20 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 
The Constant Sharpe ratio was obtained through the annualized excess return – based on the supply side model, i.e., the difference between the monthly 
returns for PSI20 and the monthly 10-year German Bond – and the historical volatility of the returns of PSI20. The forecasted volatility of the PSI20, was 
calculated based on the GARCH Model.  
WACC: For the WACC we used Equity market values and for the Debt we used book values as a proxy for market values. We used a P/B approach to forecast 
the market values of equity.  
P/B Approach 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
P/B 2.49 2.33 2.14 2.14 2.14 2.14 
Equity BV €503M €529M €561M €592M €630M €658M 
Equity MV €1,252M €1,233M €1,201M €1,268M €1,347M €1,408M 
E/V 89.10% 89.24% 89.27% 90.04% 90.80% 91.38% 
D/V 10.90% 10.76% 10.73% 9.96% 9.20% 8.62% 
 
For each year, we applied the P/B ratio to the equity book value. Through this, we obtained the market capital structure for the forecasted years, which 
converge for the weights of the terminal period, 90% Equity and 10%Debt. This structure is fairly similar to the current one using COR’s market values for 
the input variables. 
 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 =  
𝐸
𝐸𝑉
∗ 𝑅𝑒 +
𝐷
𝐸𝑉
∗ 𝑅𝑑 ∗ (1 − 𝑇𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒) 
Tax Rate: Considering the state surcharge tax rate, the company will be taxed on a scale considering three ranges of profit, which one of them will be taxed 
at a different rate. Profits between €1.5M and €7.5 the tax rate is 3%; for profits between €7.5M and €35M the tax rate is 5%; and profits higher than €35M 
the company will be taxed with a rate of 9%. Considering everything we obtained the state surcharge for each year. The municipal tax rate, 1.5% for Santa 
Maria da Feira (Aveiro), was applied to the profit before tax for each year. Adding everything to the income tax (obtained through the legal tax rate of 21%) 
and then divide that by the profit before tax we obtained the effective tax rate for each year. For the terminal period, we considered the rate from 2023F.  
Historically the tax rate is similar to this value. 
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Appendix 14: Terminal Growth Rate 
In the terminal period, we assumed a going concern approach in which cash flows grow perpetually at a continuous rate. Showy growth can also be obtained 
either by increasing CAPEX to grow organically or through strategical M&A deals. Yet, no future acquisitions are expected, thus COR should grow solely 
through internal expansion. The first approach to estimate the terminal growth rate is a function of the company’s reinvestment rate. Having this in mind, we 
proceeded to compute the growth rates for each forecasted year considering that:  
𝑭𝑪𝑭𝑭: 𝑔 = 𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∗ 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐶 
 
𝑭𝑪𝑭𝑬: 𝑔 = 𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∗ 𝑅𝑂E 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 − 𝐷&𝐴 + ∆𝑁𝑊𝐶
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇(1 − 𝑡)
 
The results are presented in the tables below.  
 FCFF 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Reinvestment Rate -3.88% 14.46% 14.31% 15.79% 15.09% 
ROIC 10.27% 11.67% 12.04% 12.36% 12.51% 
g -0.40% 1.69% 1.72% 1.95% 1.89% 
 
 FCFE 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 
Reinvestment Rate -3.88% 14.46% 14.31% 15.79% 15.09% 
ROE 12.24% 13.76% 13.96% 14.58% 14.47% 
g -0.48% 1.99% 2.00% 2.30% 2.18% 
 
The reinvestment rate above is fairly conservative giving company’s market power and growth in the short- to medium-term above 4% YoY. The addition of 
expected inflation for Portugal of 2.1% to the organic growth rate of the company in 2023F would yield a figure which we do not foresee as sustainable in the 
long run.  As such, the perpetual growth rate for the FCFF was adjusted to 2.5% considering that COR is in a mature stage and has been market leader since 
day 1, exhibited flexibility to adapt to unfavorable winds and seeks to M&A deals and innovation as a way to reinforce market power and to differentiate. 
However, we believe that in the medium term (5 to 9 years), company’s business and cash flows will grow faster than 2.5%. The company is expected to post 
consistent growth rates of 4-5% YoY spurred by increasing demand for cork stoppers.  
An equally conservative approach was employed to the perpetual g for the FCFE, although considering an adjustment upwards from the benefits of leverage. 
Bearing this in mind, g for the FCFE is forecasted at 3.0%. 
Appendix 15: FCFF Valuation 
In what concerns the FCFF model, an adjustment was carried out when moving from the Enterprise to Equity Value to take into account non-operational 
assets and financial liabilities. Other borrowings and creditors consisting of reimbursable grants received to finance operational activities and Non-
Controlling Interests were deducted, whereas Investments in associates were added back. The acquisition of the additional stake of Bourrassé in 2022 is 
considered an investment of the company and, therefore, included under CAPEX & Other Investments in the same year. 
 
 
FCFF 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
EBIT(1-tc) 67,659 80,113 85,917 92,318 96,546 
Non-Cash Charges 31,695 33,197 34,768 36,408 38,113 
CAPEX and other Investments -37,809 -39,525 -41,242 -61,936 -44,629 
∆ NWC 8,041 -5,957 -6,525 -8,780 -8,757 
FCFF 69,586 67,828 72,919 58,010 81,272 
      
Terminal growth rate (unlevered cash flow) 2.50%      
       
Price Target      
Enterprise Value 1,581,058      
 - Net Debt -95,474      
 - Other borrowings and creditors -15,717      
 - Non-controlling interests -37,575      
 + Investments in associates 11,394      
Equity Value 1,443,686      
Number of shares outstanding 133,000      
Price Target 2019YE 10.9      
       
Share Price as in 31 Dec, 2018        9.00      
Upside Potential +21%      
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Appendix 16: FCFE 
The Equity Value in the FCFE was adjusted to include Investments in Associates. While in the forecasted period, we assumed that net borrowings were equal 
to changes in the debt level (Debt issue - Debt repayments) coming from the cash flow statement, in the terminal period we followed a different approach. As 
such, in that same period, net borrowings correspond to the amount invested in net CAPEX and NWC that is financed through debt to sustain the capital 
structure as 10% of D/EV: 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 =
𝐷
𝐸𝑉
× (𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 − 𝐷&𝐴 + 𝛥 𝑁𝑊𝐶) 
FCFE 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F TV 
Net Income 63,164 75,056 80,563 89,094 93,189 95,985 
Non-Cash Charges 31,695 33,197 34,768 36,408 38,113 39,256 
CAPEX and other Investments -37,809 -39,525 -41,242 -61,936 -44,629 -45,968 
∆ NWC 8,041 -5,957 -6,525 -8,780 -8,757 -9,020 
Net Borrowing -5,925 -4,265 -4,051 -3,849 -3,656 -1,527 
FCFE 59,166 58,506 63,513 50,937 74,260 78,726 
 
Terminal growth rate (levered cash flow) 3.00% 
  
 
Price Target 
Equity Value 1,425,301 
 + Investments in associates 11,394 
Equity Value after adjustments 1,436,695 
Number of shares outstanding 133,000 
Price Target 10.8 
  
Share Price as in 31 Dec, 2018         9.00 €  
Upside Potential +20% 
Appendix 17: Dividend Discount Model (DDM) 
Regarding the DDM, the three-stage model was applied together with the H-model for the terminal period. In the H-model we considered a short-term growth 
rate of 10% that reflects the converging dividend growth YoY from 2019F to 2023F. Such rate will gradually decrease until it reaches a constant growth of 
3% in the terminal period from 2028 onwards, which corresponds to the perpetual growth rate for the FCFE. Despite the growing dividends, payout ratio 
will average 69.5% in the period 2019-23. 
  2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F 
EPS 0.47 0.56 0.61 0.67 0.70 
YoY -14.4% 18.8% 7.3% 10.6% 4.6% 
DPS 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 
YoY 11.1% 16.7% 14.3% 12.5% 11.1% 
 
Price Target 
Inputs   
Dividend 2023 0.50 
H (5 years) 2.50 
Long-term Growth 3.0% 
Short-term Growth 10.0% 
    
Terminal Value 11.38 
PV DPS 1.74 
PV Terminal Value 8.84 
Price Target 10.6 
 
Appendix 18: Residual Income 
This method is more appropriate for non-dividend paying firms which do not present stable cash flow structure over time. As COR does not meet the 
abovementioned requirements, the present method might not provide the most reliable results. Also, complexities in COR’s accounting options do not allow 
accounting adjustments that are deemed necessary. We reached a price target of €9.7/sh, although still providing upside potential from the current price. 
Residual Income 2019F 2020F 2021F  2022F 2023F 
Book Value of Equity 529,211 561,367 592,648 629,633 658,143 
Book Value of Equity per share 3.9790 4.2208 4.4560 4.7341 4.9484 
Re 6.24% 6.52% 6.52% 6.52% 6.52% 
ROE 12.24% 13.76% 13.96% 14.58% 14.47% 
Charge for Equity Capital 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.31 
EPS 0.47 0.56 0.61 0.67 0.70 
Residual Income 0.24 0.30 0.33 0.38 0.39 
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Price Target 
Projected P/B in 2023 2.14 
Book Value of Equity per share in 2023 4.95 
Projected Share Price in 2023 10.59 
PV Residual Income 1.43 
PV Projected Share Price 8.23 
Price Target 9.66 
  
Share Price as in 31 Dec, 2018             9.00 €  
Upside Potential 7.34% 
Appendix 19: Valuation through Multiples 
Apart from COR, OENEO is the only listed company operating in the cork stoppers business, thus for the multiples valuation we only considered OENEO as a 
peer company. The search for other peers in the closures market, namely Guala in the screwcaps and Nomacorc producing mainly synthetic stoppers, is not 
helpful because of market data availability. Guala’s IPO is very recent to provide reliable figures. M. A. Silva is also not listed and much smaller in size. 
It should be noted that, although considered as peers, COR and OENEO are not directly comparable, as the latter has a considerably smaller dimension and 
operates in the wine barrels business. Historically, COR multiples trade at discount. Companies operating in the wine closures market can as well be perceived 
as peers, however, as none (except Guala), are publicly traded we could not carry forward a multiple valuation based on these firms. The existence of only 
one listed peer prevents us from carrying out a valuation that yields accurate results. As a consequence, the present valuation method will not be used to 
support our recommendation, acting instead as a complement to our analysis.  
To perform the valuation, we considered the most suitable EV and Price multiples to reach the price target. The EV multiples provide better results when 
comparing companies with different levels of leveraging, whereas the Price ones are more equity focused. As both companies have different fiscal years, COR’s 
year-end multiples in 2019F were compared to those of OENEO in March 30, 2020. COR’s multiples were based on team estimates, while OENEO's forecasted 
ratios were collected from Reuters. 
 2017YE COR OENEO 
    
Total Sales (in €)  702 M 249 M 
Cork Stoppers Sales as % of Total Sales 67.30% 65.60% 
Market Share in the Cork Stoppers Industry ~44%  ~20% 
    
EBITDA margin (%) 19.04% 23.10% 
EBIT Margin (%) 14.82% 16.10% 
Net Profit Margin (%) 10.41% 12.30% 
    
Debt to Equity (x) 0.24 0.44 
ROE (%) 16.47% 12.40% 
Asset Turnover (x) 0.88 0.59 
 
 
 EV/Sales EV/EBITDA P/E P/B P/S 
Enterprise Value 1,698,406 1,187,380       
 Net Debt -95,474 -95,474       
 Other borrowings and creditors -15,717 -15,717       
 Non-controlling interests -37,575 -37,575       
 Investments in associates 11,394 11,394       
Equity Value 1,561,034 1,050,008 1,049,154 1,031,962 1,578,235 
Number of shares outstanding 133,000 133,000 133,000 133,000 133,000 
Price Target 11.74 7.89 7.89 7.76 11.87 
Average  9.82 9.17 
 
Appendix 20: Amorim family portfolio of investments 
 
  
 EV/Sales EV/EBITDA P/E P/B P/S 
COR 1.97 12.34 22.86 2.73 1.80 
OENEO 2.12 9.27 16.61 1.95 1.97 
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Appendix 21: Wine consumption prospects by main regions 
European Union 
France consumed the most wine in 2017, at 27mhl, with a per capita consumption averaging 40 liters. However, the French market has been experiencing a 
decrease in consumption. From 2013 to 2017, total consumption decreased by 2.9%. Changes in drinking habits of younger generations have been attributed 
the blame, with this demographic perceiving wine as an occasional beverage for special times instead of a cultural heritage. Overall, lower growth in the 
consumption of wine is expected for the European Union when compared to the global market, mainly due to shifts in consumer behavior and health concerns. 
Forecasts are for +1.13% CAGR from 2017-25. 
USA 
North-Americans are the world’s leading consumers of wine (13.4% of global consumption), with sales revenue for 2017 in the industry of USD 62.7B. 
Consumption of wine in the country has increased by 5.8% since 2013 and is expected to continue to grow at a 6% CAGR from 2018-22. Lower-priced wines 
account for 55% of this market, however, the segment is decreasing in favor of more expensive wines (considered to be those above $10). Premium wines 
($10-$20) and fine wines (>$20) are expected to grow at 10% and 8% YoY, respectively, 2018-2022. Increased purchasing power due to higher GDP (Figure 
14) helps explain this preference toward high-end goods. This shift will benefit the cork industry as demand for natural cork stoppers will increase.  
China 
Wine consumption increased by 8.5% between 2013 (16.5 mhl) and 2017 (17.9 mhl), with an annual average increase of almost 5%. During this period, wine 
imports doubled, increasing 2.1% CAGR from 2011-17. Growing health concerns contributed to this growth, as 77% of Chinese admit to drink wine because 
of its health benefits. Additionally, according to Tsang (2018), wine is no longer perceived as an occasional beverage, unlike in Europe, and at-home 
consumption has been rising and now represents over 50% of overall consumption. Sales in the Chinese market are expected to reach USD 24.02B by 2018YE, 
with a projected CAGR 2018-21 of 5%. According to ISWR and Vinexpo (2017), China will become the world’s second largest wine consuming country by 
2021. For the cork industry, this increase will translate into an augmented market share for this region. 
Appendix 22: Construction Industry prospects by main regions 
China 
The Chinese construction industry is set to face a deceleration with a forecasted CAGR in 2017-21 of 5.70%, down from a CAGR in 2012-2016 of +7.43%.  
Despite such slowdown, China is expected to continue holding the largest market in the industry.  
US 
The United States represents the second largest market of the industry and is expected to grow at a CAGR in 2018-2022 of +2.22%, slightly lower than the 
+3.80% CAGR of 2013-2017, but a clear improvement gave the contraction of -1% in 2017. Such growth will be mainly supported by public and private 
investment to build and revamp infrastructures.  
Western Europe 
After a period of sluggishness, first due to the subprime crisis and second as a consequence of the debt crisis, the Western European construction market is 
expected to bounce back between 2018 and 2022, expanding at a CAGR of +2.4%, up from +1.1% in 2013-2017. Germany will continue to lead the way with 
a CAGR in 2018-2022 of +1.9% bolstered by increasing demand for housing units and public investment in transportation infrastructure. 
Appendix 23: Possible game-changing acquisitions 
M&A activity is not likely in the coming years since COR has to focus on managing efficiency on the recent acquisitions of Bourrassé, Sodiliège and Elfverson. 
The appetite for M&A to consolidate its leading position may have a few candidates, although deals would be difficult to settle. OENEO’s closure segment is 
an example, as it is responsible for the production of 2.5B stoppers (20% market share) in 2017YE. The segment is divided between two subsidiaries, Diam 
(1.8B stoppers) and Piedade (0.7B stoppers) and both focus on the manufacture of technical cork stoppers. In 2017, Piedade’s natural and agglomerated cork 
stoppers activities were discontinued. OENEO is fully owned by the Dubreuil family through its family holding Andromède. 
The investment portfolio of the Dubreuil family ranges, among others, from cork stoppers and wine barrels business, through OENEO (Market cap: €570M), 
to the production of cognac, liqueurs and spirits business, through Rémy-Cointreau (Market cap: €5B). The family’s presence in the wine business makes it 
highly unlikely for a takeover to occur. OENEO supplies the famous cognac producer Rémy-Cointreau with closures (40-50M bottles) in an integrated value 
chain, boosting the profits of the group. OENEO’s closure segment represents 65% of the company’s revenue, which imposes a floor on the acquisition price 
of roughly 65% (€ 370M) of the company’s market cap. Historical premiums in similar acquisitions (e.g., Bourrassé) of 45% would imply an investment 
around €500M - €550M for OENEO’s, which would be a huge, if not impossible bite for Amorim.  
After COR’s acquisition of Bourrassé, M.A. Silva emerged as the 3rd largest player, with a total output of 0.6B stoppers. Owned by the Silva family, this 
Portuguese-based company offers both natural and technical stoppers. EBITDA margin of 6.75% 2017YE for sales of €66m and interest-bearing debt 56.2% 
of total assets, of which around 83% due short-term, makes it an attractive target for COR. Industry’s multiples and recent premiums price M.A. Silva in the 
range of €30-35M for a takeover. The synergies would mostly come from Amorim’s abilities to operate more efficiently (~13% difference in EBITDA margins) 
and purchase raw material at a lower price, leaving room for an added value of €70M-€75M. Still, the family character of M.A. Silva is a relevant barrier for a 
deal and it may be too expensive for COR’s strategy of consolidating its position in the industry.  
By the same token, not negligible and perhaps more likely, is the threat of a possible deal between M.A. Silva and COR’s biggest competitor. OENEO’s 
operational efficiency (20.1% EBITDA margin in 2017YE) also allows them to obtain similar synergies from the deal. Moreover, their intention to discontinue 
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the agglomerated and natural cork stoppers segment of its subsidiary, Piedade, may serve as a bargaining chip. M.A.Silva could be interested in the natural 
cork stoppers business of Piedade, while simultaneously obtaining synergies from OENEO’s more efficient management of the technical stoppers segments. 
The combined company would have close to 25% of market share, being a significant threat to COR’s leadership in the cork stoppers industry.  
2017 
Bourrassé 
(Acquired in 2017) 
M. A. SILVA 
(Potential acquisition) 
OENEO Amorim   
  
Sales (in M) 53.30 66.10 248.60 701.60   
Number of 
employees 450.00 234.00 1,130.00 4,248.00   
Gross margin 26.69% 38.63% 41.20% 53.24%   
EBITDA margin 6.25% 6.75% 23.10% 19.04%   
Net profit margin 3.44% 1.56% 12.30% 10.41%   
ROE 11.51% 7% 12.40% 15.88%   
Asset turnover 1.44 1.13 0.60 0.81   
D/E 1.06 2.24 0.44 0.24   
Number of stoppers 0.7B 0.6B 2.5B 4.7B   
       
Possible 
acquisition targets 
M. A. SILVA OENEO 
    
     Equity stake 15-20M 370M**     
     Premium 17M* 130-180M     
Acquisition price 30-35M 500-550M     
*estimated premium based on the same % of potential synergies paid in a Bourrassé deal (22%) 
Total potential synergy from MASILVA deal c. 75M 
** 65% of OENEO's Market Cap 
       
Valuation of 
M. A. SILVA 
Industry average 
(2017) 
EV Net debt Equity Premium 
Acquisition 
price 
EV/EBITDA 10.9 48.5 30.4 18.1 17.0 35.1 
EV/EBIT 14.0 45.4 30.4 15.0 17.0 32.0 
Average       16.6   33.6 
 
Appendix 24: Supply Chain (COR) 
 
 
Appendix 25: Other information regarding the cork stoppers industry 
We carried out a survey to the supply side of the cork industry to further deepen our knowledge in this industry and to understand the degree of uncertainty 
imminent to the business.  
Other minor risks affecting the cork oak forest: The increased urbanization leads to the need for more infrastructures, reducing the availability of land. 
Often, properties are handed down between generations, which no longer take advantage of the cork oaks. This reduces the amount of cork oaks available 
for harvest, impacting companies in this industry.  
Purchases of arroba: As a natural hedge against the uncertainty of cork bark price, producers buy raw materials above their needs. This is a widely adopted 
policy and does not represent an extra cost for companies, as facilities are already prepared for it. Extraction costs, on the other hand, may add costs to the 
company. These can be included in the cork price if the seller is responsible for the extraction. If the responsibility relies on the buyer, cork price will be lower. 
An integrated chain value will be a competitive advantage in these cases.  
General Costs per Stopper: Costs will vary based on the type of stopper. Natural cork stoppers require a whole piece of cork bark, representing three-
quarters of the cost, while the rest is dependent on human labor. Technical stoppers, on the other hand, are made from grinded leftover cork, which is cheaper. 
Therefore, the raw-materials will only account for one-quarter of the cost.  
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Storage: After the production, cork stoppers have no limited storage time, if kept in suitable facilities. The stoppers are still not ready to be used, yet the final 
treatment is only applied by wineries. Before moving to the bottle, winemakers will print the final label and prepare stoppers for inserting. Afterward, cork 
stoppers may only be stored for 6 months.  
 
 
Appendix 26: COR’s Shareholder Structure 
 
Appendix 27: Governance Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 28: BoD Remuneration 
Director Age Position 
Held 
Since 
Term Fixed Variable 
Total 
Remuneration 
António Rios de Amorim 50 Chairman of the BoD and CEO 2001 2019 239,239 € 110,600 € 349,839 € 
Nuno Barroca de 
Oliveira 
47 Vice-Chairman 2003 2019 169,239 € 55,600 € 224,839 € 
Fernando Santos 
Almeida 
56 Executive Board Member 2009 2019 141,239 € 59,885 € 201,124 € 
Cristina Amorim 
Baptista 
49 Non-Executive Board Member 2012 2019 - - - 
Luísa Ramos Amorim 44 
Non-Executive Board Member and 
CFO 
2003 2019 - - - 
Juan Viñas 77 Non-Executive Board Member 2012 2019 - - - 
Total         549,718 € 226,085 € 775,803 € 
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Appendix 29: Relation between Household Disposable Income (HDI) and wine consumption 
To test the correlation between wine consumption and HDI, we performed two regressions using data from the US and China. The results obtained were the 
following:  
𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
𝑈𝑆 = 7.5 + 0.00051𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖
𝑈𝑆                𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎 = 12.1 + 0.00015𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖
𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎  
 
 
Source: OECD and OIV 
 
Appendix 30: Risk Matrix 
 
Source: Team estimates 
New Entrants (MR7) 
Barriers to entry in this industry are quite high, even though the industry is fragmented. COR, and other players have longstanding relations with suppliers, 
as the amount of cork bark harvested changes every year. It would be unlikely for a new player entering the market to establish these connections. 
Furthermore, COR has over 40% market share and recently acquired the 3rd player in this industry, Bourrassé. The company is a price setter, making it difficult 
for a new entrant to impact the market.  
Climate Change Risk (MR6) 
Cork oak trees grow in the Western Mediterranean Basin, where temperatures vary from -5ºC to 40ºC. The rainfall per year is between 400mm and 800mm 
and the soil has a high level of potassium, low nitrogen and phosphorus, no presence of chalk and with a pH from 4.8 to 7.0. However, due to climate change, 
this region is becoming hotter (Figure 31). Resulting droughts affect the growth of the trees and the quality of cork extracted. In Spain, owners have been 
increasing extraction cycles to contradict the lack of quality. COR developed a micro-irrigation and fertilization system that enables to overcome the scarcity 
of water and its consequences. Still, the system is yet to be implemented throughout the Montados area. 
Interest Rate Risk (MR9) 
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By 2017YE, almost 78% of COR’s financial debt was floating. Debt is totally in EUR, making the company exposed to ECB’s monetary policies. The company 
has been benefiting from low-interest rates, however these are expected to increase after the summer of 2019. Since COR finances itself mostly through 
equity, changes in interest rates will have a low impact due to the capital structure. 
Forest Risk (MR3) 
Wildfires pose a problem for this industry as it delays the harvest of burned trees. Even though these trees are highly resistant to elevated temperatures, due 
to its humidity content, the government imposes some rules to assure its perseverance. After being affected by fires, cork oaks must recover for a minimum 
of one year before the harvest of the bark is allowed. Nevertheless, the majority of fires in Portugal are located in the north, and the probability of these 
affecting the Montados area is medium-low.  
Lack of Human Resources (OR1) 
Human Resources play a crucial role in the company’s business, impacting the harvesting, production and distribution processes.  The cork harvest and 
production activities are expected to continue witnessing a decline in its workforce as a consequence of the rising education levels of the population coupled 
with the prevailing rural exodus trend. In order to tackle such issue, COR has been investing in R&D activities that prompt the automatization of certain 
production processes, increasing efficiency and reducing the need for human resources in the medium/long-term.  
Price of the cork stoppers (MR4) 
COR’s average price per stopper sold is increasing YoY. Over the last 5 years, it increased by 16.5% to slightly above 10 cents. This increase reflects the change 
in the product mix, as well as COR’s ability to pass to the customers part of the increased raw material costs. As the company faces an elastic demand, that 
narrows its options of passing some of the increasing costs to customers. Disregarding natural cork stoppers, the average price of stoppers is almost flat 
during the previous years, despite the increase in costs. The change in product mix is affected by the shift in consumers’ preferences towards premium wines, 
often sealed with natural cork stoppers. Consequently, sales of this type of stopper have been increasing (+1% YoY for the last 5 years), representing 75% of 
the still wine segment 2017YE. Improved product mix accounted for 40% of the gross margin increase 2017YE (less than 30% 2016YE). Thus, any change in 
consumer preferences would make a significant adverse effect on the company’s sales and margins. 
Corporate Governance Risk (GR1) 
COR is a family-owned company which carries some risks to minority shareholders. Even though COR only fully meets 26 of the 43 CMVM Corporate 
Governance Recommendations, we do not believe the company is harming the interest of shareholders. Despite the lack of an explicit target payout policy, 
profits are being distributed regularly and investments are being made to improve the company’s overall performance.   
Regulatory Risk (RL1) 
The Mediterranean oak is the national tree of Portugal, protected by law to guarantee its conservation and maintenance. It’s mandatory to respect the 9 years 
harvesting cycles to assure the recovery of the oak, and the tree can never be ripped out even in case of sickness or death. (Decreto Lei nº 155/2004) In the 
other regions were cork-oaks are grown, the 9-year cycles are also maintained, as this ensures the quality of the bark. 
Construction Industry (MR8) 
The Construction Industry contributes to approximately 22% of the company’s sales. A sharp slowdown in the business would trigger a contraction in the 
overall demand, affecting the company’s financial performance. Moreover, the cyclical nature of the industry suggests a higher sensitivity to economic cycles’ 
swings.  
Appendix 31: Porter’s Five Forces 
Construction Industry 
Threat of Substitute Products | Low (2) 
Raw materials and products used in the construction industry benefit from a unique nature, with the vast majority of them not having close substitutes. The 
services rendered are also difficult to substitute as most involve human labor, which cannot be fully automatized. Nowadays, there is a growing preference 
for more environmentally friendly construction products as a way to cope with increasing pollution. Notwithstanding, as these products still have a residual 
market share and hardly replace those considered to be core, the threat of substitutes in this industry is believed to be low. 
 
Bargaining Power of Suppliers | Low (2) 
Construction companies rely heavily on suppliers who provide raw materials, machinery and equipment deemed necessary to carry out their activity. Raw 
materials suppliers have weaker bargaining power in comparison to those of equipment and machinery which can exert higher, but not significant, pressure 
on buyers. Overall, the bargaining power of suppliers is considered to be relatively low as the lack of product differentiation coupled with low switching costs 
does not leave significant room for price negotiation on the supply side. Moreover, the existence of a large number of suppliers, in particular, those of Raw 
materials, also contributes to lower bargaining power.    
 
Bargaining Power of Buyers | Moderate (3) 
As the size of the supply side is considerably superior to the demand one, buyers are exposed to a wide range of suppliers willing to sell a quite similar product 
or service at very different prices. Buyers’ easiness in switching from one supplier to other is a clear indicator of the significant power these can exert on the 
supply side.  For all these reasons, the bargaining power of buyers is considered to be moderate.  
 
Rivalry Among Existing Competitors | Significant (4) 
Competition among players is high as the companies that comprise the Construction industry are quite homogenous, providing very similar services and 
products. The limited number of projects spurs intense rivalry, especially within SME companies, which altogether account for the majority of the industry.  
Large companies with extensive financial resources often undertake large-scale governmental projects, competing fiercely between themselves to win the 
bidding process.   As the industry is highly fragmented and operates on low-profit margins, companies will strive to gain competitive advantage mostly 
through price reductions and sub-contracts. Additionally, the highly saturated nature of market contributes to an intensification of the competition within 
industry firms.  
  
Threat of New Entrants | Low (2) 
The start-up costs to enter in the industry vary across the different segments of the industry. Segments that are more capital intensive, such as the 
Infrastructure one, present higher barriers to entry compared to those which do not require high investment in physical assets. Nevertheless, the overall 
barriers to entry in the industry are deemed as high mostly due to the heavy initial investment that is required. In addition to this, newcomers find it difficult 
to have access to distribution channels as the existent companies benefit from well-established networks based on reputation and trust. The lack of economies 
of scale coupled with the low margins of the industry pose as well as an issue to firms trying to enter in the market, as these will struggle to keep up with the 
existent ones. Bearing this in mind, the threat of newcomers in the market is fairly low. 
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Appendix 32: Sensitivity Analysis 
Other Bus: We are assuming that the Floor & Wall Coverings BU will experience a slow growth until it reaches a growth equal to the construction industry 
CAGR. Changes in the construction CAGR will not change our BUY recommendation. Additionally, we forecast the Composites BU to grow at the historical 
rate. If this rate increases to the construction CAGR, our BUY recommendation will persist. Both BUs do not affect significantly the price target, due to the low 
% they have on total sales. 
    Price Target 
                10.9 €  
F
&
W
 g
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w
th
 
0.36%             10.5 €  
1.08%             10.5 €  
2.52%             10.7 €  
3.60%             10.9 €  
5.40%             11.1 €  
7.20%             11.4 €  
9.00%             11.8 €  
 
Appendix 33: Piotroski Score 
 13 14 15 16 17 18F 19F 20F 21F 22F 23F 
Profitability                        
   Positive NI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
   Positive ROA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
   Positive OCF 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
   OCF > NI 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Leverage, Liquidity                        
   LTD ratio N < LTD ratio N-1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
   CR N > CR N-1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
   Δ shares issued 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Efficiency Criteria                       
   GP N > GP N-1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
  ATR N > ATR N-1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Total 6.00 8.00 8.00 6.00 5.00 5.00 7.00 9.00 9.00 8.00 9.00 
 
Appendix 34: Exports of cork by type of stoppers 
 
Appendix 35:  Abbreviations 
Basis points (bps) 
Billion (B) 
Board of Directors (BoD) 
Business Unit(s) (BU(s)) 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)  
Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
Comissão do Mercado e Valores Mobiliários (CMVM) 
Compounded Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) 
Corticeira Amorim S.G.P.S., S.A. (COR) 
Debt-to-Enterprise Value (D/EV) 
Depreciation and Amortization (D&A) 
Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) 
Dividend Discount Model (DDM) 
Dividends per Share (DPS) 
Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciations and Amortizations (EBITDA) 
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    Price Target 
                10.9 €  
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1.70%             10.8 €  
1.89%             10.9 €  
2.27%             10.9 €  
2.65%             11.0 €  
3.02%             11.0 €  
3.59%             11.1 €  
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Enterprise Value (EV) 
Enterprise Value to Sales (EV/S)  
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) 
Floor and Wall (F&W)  
Forecasted (F) 
Free Cash Flow to Equity (FCFE) 
Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF) 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
Household Disposable Income (HDI) 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
Market Risk Premium (MRP) 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A)  
Million Hectare Liters (mhl) 
Millions (M) 
Net Working Capital (NWC) 
Price to Book (P/B) 
Price to Earnings (PE) 
Price to Sales (P/S) 
Research & Development and Innovation (R&D+I)  
Return on Equity (ROE) 
Risk-Free Rate (RFR) 
Share (Sh) 
Sum of the Parts (SoP) 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
Target Price (TP) 
Trichloroanisole (TCA) 
Trillion (T) 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) 
Year End (YE) 
Year on Year (YoY) 
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